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Revocation of Tripartite Rolling Contracts:
Finding a Remedy in the Twenty-First Century
Usage of Trade
GREGORY J. KRABACHER*
A buyer's right to revoke acceptance of nonconforming goods under U C. C. § 2-
608 can be thought of as a universal lemon-law, hard-wired into the sales
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. In consumer transactions, this
provision can be an especially important means of leveling the playing field
where, for example, a good's defect is diffcult to ascertain at the point of sale.
However, the pace of change in modern commerce has vastly outstripped the
minor changes enacted by US. jurisdictions since Article 2's original conception
in the 1940s. As a consequence, US. courts have struggled to decide cases under
the current version of the Code involving aform of contracting referred to in this
Note as "tripartite rolling contracts. " In this form of sales contract, the
manufacturer slips contract terms inside the product packaging that are
applicable to the end-purchaser, and which are passed on by a disclaiming
intermediary retailer. The problem for consumers is that not only are these
hidden terms enforceable in most jurisdictions, but the consumer's right to
revoke against the manufacturer is lost, under one construction of U C.C § 2-
608, by virtue of the disclaiming intermediary who breaks the chain ofprivity.
The 2003 Amendments to Article 2 and other uniform codification efforts such as
the Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act (UCITA) appear to
ameliorate the problem by holding manufacturers accountable in tripartite
rolling contracts. Alas, adoption is moving slowly for the new Article 2 and
UCITA appears to be a lost cause in its present form. Recognizing the very real
possibility that the currently enacted Article 2 may remain the law of the land in
most jurisdictions for years to come, how can courts equitably decide cases
while remaining true to the law enacted by state legislatures?
This Note pragmatically examines the dual axes of the consumer's dilemma, i.e.,
the enforceability of terms inside the product packaging and the bar to
revocation against a remote manufacturer. Informed by a survey of the case law,
equitable principles, and the practical necessities of the twenty-first century
usage of trade, it is concluded that the more vulnerable axis is that of the bar to
revocation. Therefore, a solution is put forth, consistent with a strong minority of
U.S. jurisdictions, that construes the current version of U.C.C. § 2-608 to be
available to consumers against remote manufacturers where manufacturers
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instigate tripartite rolling contracts by slipping terms inside of the packaging of
the nonconforming goods they produce.
I. INTRODUCTION
The legal machinery for sales transactions on the books in nearly all U.S.
jurisdictions, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, reflects the time period
in which it was conceived. One can imagine a typical sales transaction in the
1940s, back when the Code was originally drafted,' as the kind of thing Norman
Rockwell might have painted-for example, a soda-pop jerk with a big smile and
a white hat ringing up a five-cent Cherry Coke for a freckled-faced teenager. This
simple transaction involves two parties: a seller and a buyer. Hence, Article 2's
provisions to this day are replete with references to the "buyer" and "seller" and
I Work started on Article 2 in 1942. Various drafts, some of which curiously (or
optimistically) were labeled "final," were debated and approved by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) beginning in 1943 and
by the American Law Institute (ALI) beginning in 1944. See THE AM. LAW INST. &
NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE: MAY
1949 DRAFT vii (1949) (listing the earlier dates of submission of each U.C.C. Article's
original text). The recognized first "official" version of the U.C.C. was promulgated in
1951 and enacted in Pennsylvania in 1953, effective July 1, 1954. See UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE OFFICIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS, General Comment Of National
Conference Of Commissioners On Uniform State Laws And The American Law Institute
(2004).
The 1951 version of Article 2 has been adopted in all U.S. jurisdictions, save
Louisiana and Puerto Rico. While the state of Louisiana has resisted adoption of U.C.C.
Article 2 in favor of its long enacted civil code sales provisions, it did adopt an updated
civil code in 1993 that has many sales provisions inspired by Article 2. See Christian Paul
Callens, Comment, Louisiana Civil Law and The Uniform Commercial Code:
Interpreting the New Louisiana U. C. C. -Inspired Sales Articles on Price, 69 TUL. L. REV.
1649, 1651 (1995). However, the U.C.C.-invented concept of "revocation of acceptance,"
which is the focus of this Note, is absent from the updated Louisiana Code. Rather, the
traditional term "rescission" has been retained by Louisiana in describing a buyer's rights
triggered by latent defects discovered after acceptance. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2520
(West 1996) ("Warranty against redhibitory [hidden] defects").
As other U.C.C. Articles have been revised over the years, minor conforming
amendments have been made to Article 2, the last of which came with the 1999 revision
of Article 9. This 1999 version is now the controlling law in all the U.S. jurisdictions,
except of course, Louisiana and Puerto Rico. Unless otherwise specified, all references to
U.C.C. Article 2 or its specific provisions pertain to this version of the code. Where
specifically noted, especially in Parts III.C.2 and IV.C. 1 infra, the newly promulgated
2003 Amendments to Article 2 are referenced. At the time of this writing, no jurisdiction
has adopted the 2003 Amendments and only one state, Kansas, has even introduced
legislation on the matter. See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, Final Acts and Legislation, Articles 2 and 2A (2003), Bill Tracking, at
http://www.nccusl.org/Update (last visited Mar. 9, 2005).
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have the general thrust of describing sales transactions in a perceived buyer/seller
dichotomy.2
As commerce and the parties themselves have become more sophisticated, a
model of mass merchandizing that involves three or more parties has developed
in the usage of trade. Seller and buyer have become a false dichotomy. In its
essential form, this model involves the following three parties: an end-purchaser,
which may be a consumer; the entity from whom the consumer purchases the
goods, for example a retailer; and thirdly, a manufacturer who warrants and/or
makes various restrictions on the goods applicable to the end purchaser. Thus,
following the distribution chain, the manufacturer sells goods to the retailer who
in turn resells them to the buyer, creating privity of sales contract between the
manufacturer and retailer, contract one, and between the retailer and buyer,
contract two. A third agreement is offered by the manufacturer who encloses
warranty or licensing terms inside of the product packaging. Upon accepting the
terms of this third agreement, which may occur after the money and goods have
changed hands, the buyer simultaneously consummates his relationship with both
the manufacturer and retailer.3 Thus, the term "tripartite rolling contract" is used
herein to refer to the delayed acceptance by the buyer in a transaction he
undertakes simultaneously with multiple parties.4 Courts and commentators have
applied a variety of labels on the manufacturer in this tripartite relationship,
including "remote seller,"5 "third-party warrantor,"6 "remote manufacturer," 7 and
"non-selling manufacturer."'8
Faced with the challenge of deciding modem-day disputes involving this
dispersed, tripartite relationship, courts have struggled in interpreting the currently
2 The buyer/seller dichotomy is described in virtually every provision of Article 2
including the provisions governing formation (U.C.C. §§ 2-201-210 (1999)), the
obligations of the parties (U.C.C. §§ 2-301-328 (1999)), title (U.C.C. §§ 2-401-403
(1999)), performance (U.C.C. §§ 2-501-515 (1999)), breach (U.C.C. §§ 2-601-616
(1999)), and remedies (U.C.C. §§ 2-701-725 (1999)).
3 See Harry M. Flechtner, Enforcing Manufacturers' Warranties, "Pass Through"
Warranties, and the Like: Can the Buyer Get a Refund?, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 397, 452-
55 (1998). Professor Flechtner explains that the described warranty and sales contracts
are formed simultaneously and are backed by a single consideration, the purchase price
paid by the buyer. See id. at 455.
4 As discussed further in Part III infra, in a rolling contract the buyer's opportunity
to reject both the warranty and sales contract is extended past the point in which
consideration is given and the good received. See ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447,
1452-53 (7th Cir. 1996) (authorizing rolling contracts for software sales).
5 See Gary L. Monserud, Blending the Law of Sales with the Common Law of Third
Party Beneficiaries, 39 DUQ. L. REV. 111, 177 (2000).
6 See Flechtner, supra note 3, at 453.
7 See id. at 405; see also Gochey v. Bombardier Inc., 572 A.2d 921, 923 (Vt. 1990).
8 See Kutzler v. Thor Indus., No. 03-C2389, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11886, at *20
(N.D. 11l. July 11, 2003).
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adopted version of Article 2, which was seemingly designed with the bipartite
variety of contract in mind.9 The unhappy result for consumers in a majority of
cases has been the limitation of one of consumers' most potent weapons, the right
to revoke acceptance of goods under U.C.C. § 2-608. In examining the legal
doctrines responsible for the formation of tripartite rolling contracts as well as the
prohibitions on their revocation in some situations, it becomes apparent that
consumers are effectively being struck by a "one-two punch" in a majority of
jurisdictions.
The "left jab" of this combination punch was most notably thrown by Judge
Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit in the case of ProCD v. Zeidenberg.'0 This
case, discussed in greater detail, infra, approved the practice of manufacturers
who slip contract terms inside the product packaging, thus binding the end
purchaser to new terms after the money and goods have changed hands. In other
words, ProCD allowed the formation of a tripartite rolling contract. The rub is
that it matters not under ProCD if the consumer actually reads, understands, or
means to be bound by these new terms-acceptance occurs however the terms
say it occurs. For example, the terms may define acceptance as occurring by a
consumer simply using the goods or even where he takes no action at all and
allows a period of time to elapse. I I Thus, consumers who are sold defective
goods and who are not quick enough to get out of harm's way, may unwittingly
trigger the defined mode of acceptance and then get bitten by serpentine warranty
disclaimers and other limitations that are hidden in the tall grass of boilerplate
contracts of adhesion. 12
The majority construction of currently adopted U.C.C. § 2-608 completes the
combination punch analogy by landing a "right hook" once consumers have
unwittingly "agreed" to the post-sale terms made enforceable by ProCD. U.C.C.
§ 2-608 is interpreted by majority-view courts to prevent consumers who "accept"
the terms of tripartite rolling contracts from exercising their power of revocation
of acceptance against third-party manufacturers. This is true even where the
manufacturer was the one who instigated the tripartite relationship to begin with,
who induced the sale between the retailer and consumer through advertising its
warranty, and who is the party actually responsible for the nonconformity in the
goods. 13
The basic unfairness of joint application of ProCD's enduring doctrine and
the majority construction of U.C.C. § 2-608 is highlighted with a hypothetical
consumer transaction in Part 11. The next section, Part EI, explores the origins and
9 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
10 86 F.3d 1447, 1452-53 (7th Cir. 1996) (authorizing rolling contracts for software
sales).
" See id. at 1452.
12 See infra Part III.
13 See infra Part IV.
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jurisdictional adoption of the Seventh Circuit approach to enforcing tripartite
rolling contracts. Part IV analyzes competing interpretations of U.C.C. § 2-608 in
jurisdictions that allow or prohibit revocation against remote manufacturers. Both
Parts 1II and IV consider the impact of the 2003 Amendments to Article 2, which
are currently being considered by the states for adoption, as well as the wildly
unpopular Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UC1TA). Both
model rules comprehensively address tripartite rolling contracts and therefore are
highly likely to shape future jurisprudence in this area, at least indirectly. The
final substantive section, Part V, recommends an approach that preserves the
twenty-first century usage of trade, namely the enforcement of tripartite rolling
contracts, while providing an appropriate level of protection to consumers.
Simply stated, where a tripartite rolling contract binds a remote purchaser it
should be revocable against the one who offered it originally. As will be
explained, the recommended approach provides a consistent application of the
Uniform Commercial Code in both the formation and revocation of tripartite
rolling contracts while also balancing the current inequity. As argued below, the
recommended interpretation of § 2-608 has a sound basis in the currently adopted
version of the codel 4-and has an even stronger basis in the 2003 Amendments
to Article 2, should they be adopted in the future.
II. THE PROBLEM CREATED FOR CONSUMERS
The basic unfairness of joint-application of ProCD and majority U.C.C. § 2-
608 is perhaps easiest to see in consumer transactions. We are all consumers and,
as such, we are all too familiar with the chicanery that sometimes ensues when a
product is defective.
A. Hypothetical Consumer Transaction
Joe Consumer visits his local Megagadgets store to purchase a hot new
consumer item called the iBreak, manufactured by Banana Computer. The iBreak
is a portable music player and comes packaged with computer software integral to
the device's operation. A Megagadgets salesperson convinces Joe that the iBreak
is a "truly fantastic piece of machinery" while carefully avoiding any express
guarantees of the product's quality or fitness for a particular purpose. Joe asks the
sales clerk the meaning of a prominently displayed message near the store's cash
register which reads, "ALL GOODS ARE SOLD 'AS IS.' MEGAGADGETS
MAKES NO WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING THE
14 Unless otherwise specified, references to Article 2 or specific provisions of the
U.C.C. in this Note pertain to the 1999 version, the last NCCUSL/ALI update preceding
the 2003 Amendments. This version has been adopted in nearly all fifty states and the
District of Columbia and is therefore presently the controlling law in nearly all U.S.
jurisdictions. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
2005]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY." The clerk shrugs his shoulders and
points Joe to the product display advertising the manufacturer's One-Year
Limited Warranty. Although the One-Year Limited Warranty was also advertised
in small print on the product packaging, the warranty terms are not provided. The
advertisement also does not mention any warranty disclaimers or restrictions on
the product's use. Joe figures that the One-Year Limited Warranty will probably
be sufficient and, not knowing what "merchantability" means anyway, he is
frankly relieved not to have to worry about it.1 5 Joe proceeds to the check-out
line, iBreak in-hand, pays the cashier the sum required, and walks out of the store
with the product.16
Upon arriving home, Joe, a self-described Luddite, enlists the help of his ten-
year old wiz kid, Bailey, to get his new electronic gizmo up and running. Bailey
tears open the product packaging and begins to connect the iBreak's various wires
and other parts. After hooking the iBreak up to Joe's computer, Bailey inserts the
software installation CD and begins the installation procedure. While Bailey is
installing the software Joe notices that an "I agree" screen appears momentarily
on his computer monitor. Bailey quickly clicks "OK" and explains that this is just
a bunch of legal stuff and you have to click "OK" for the product to work.
Scanning a paper copy of the One- Year Warranty Agreement that came inside
the iBreak's box, Joe realizes that if he really wanted to know what the warranty
meant he would have to hire a lawyer that would probably cost more than the
product was worth. Uncomfortable, but feeling that there really was not another
option, Joe decides not to worry about the warranty. Besides, what could go
wrong?
Unfortunately for Joe, this question would soon be answered. Although the
iBreak functioned very well at first, after a few days its entire memory erased,
requiring Bailey to reload all of Joe's music onto the device. When this happened
a second time, Joe took the product into an authorized Banana Computer service
15 The implied warranty of merchantability means that goods must be fit for their
ordinary purpose. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (1999). To be disclaimed a seller must specifically
use the word "merchantability" or mark the goods "As Is." Id. Recognizing that most
consumers do not understand the meaning of the legal term "merchantability," the 2003
Amendments to Article 2 now require more transparent language for disclaimer in
consumer transactions. To disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability under the
2003 Amendments, the seller must state the following: "The seller undertakes no
responsibility for the quality of the goods except as otherwise provided in this contract."
See U.C.C. § 2-314 (amended 2003).
16 The point at which a buyer exchanges money and receives a good in return is the
traditional completion of the offer and acceptance process in a consumer sales
transaction. As Judge Easterbrook concedes in ProCD, "placing the package of software
on the shelf is an 'offer,' which the customer 'accepts' by paying the asking price and
leaving the store with the goods." ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450 (after conceding the traditional
mode of formation proceeding to explain the delayed formation involved in a rolling
contract).
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repair dealer to have it fixed. The repair shop kept the iBreak for six weeks and
successfully solved the problem. The day after Joe got the iBreak home one of its
buttons popped off. Joe dutifully returned the iBreak to the repair shop, which
once again fixed the problem, holding it for a mere three weeks this time. After
two more similar problems and consequent loss of the product's use, Joe decided
he had had enough.17
Joe's first step was to package the product up and try to return it to the
Megagadget's store in which it had been purchased. The store manager explained
to Joe that the terms spelled out on the sign near the cash register that disclaimed
all warranties including the implied warranty of merchantability meant that Joe
must deal with the manufacturer directly for any sort of refund. 18 The manager
further explained to Joe that it was store policy not to accept returned goods in
which the packaging had been opened. This was especially true for products that
had been purchased on a date more than thirty days before.19
17 The problems represented in the hypothetical are entirely fictitious. No
implication is meant in regard to the performance of any actual product or the willingness
of any manufacturer to make repairs.
18 "Retailers... commonly avoid making express warranties and disclaim implied
warranties, leaving only the manufacturer's warranty applicable in many transactions.
Moreover, even if a retailer is subject to a warranty of merchantability, the resulting
scope of liability is narrower than under a typical manufacturer warranty against all
defects." Martin B. White, Retail Sellers and the Enforcement of Manufacturer
Warranties: An Application of the Uniform Commercial Code to Consumer Product
Distribution Systems, 32 WAYNE L. REv. 1049, 1054 (1986). The rationale for holding
disclaiming sellers harmless is a strong one. As explained by one Florida Appellate
Court:
Where a dealer has properly disclaimed all warranties, the delivering, presenting, or
explaining of a manufacturer's warranty, without more, does not render the dealer a
co-warrantor by adoption.., nor does it create a contractual obligation which can
serve as a basis for a buyer's later revocation of acceptance. Should we hold
otherwise, an automobile dealer would effectively be precluded from disclaiming
responsibility for the warranties of the manufacturer, despite the fact that [the
Florida equivalent of U.C.C. § 2-316] authorizes a dealer to do so.
Frank Griffin Volkswagen v. Smith, 610 So. 2d 597, 599 (Fl. Ct. App. 1992) (internal
citations omitted); see also infra notes 137-38 and accompanying text; compare infra
note 136 and accompanying text (noting that such disclaimer is effective only after the
time for rejection has passed).
19 Having properly disclaimed all warranties, including the implied warranty of
merchantability, Megagadgets has no liability if the goods are defective. In keeping the
product for a period of many weeks he has arguably failed to make his rejection within a
reasonable time pursuant to U.C.C. § 2-602(1) (1999). Since Joe's reasonable opportunity
to inspect has expired, he has therefore accepted the goods by default under § 2-606(l)(b)
(1999). The effect of acceptance is that a buyer may no longer reject the goods. See
U.C.C. § 2-607(2) (1999).
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Joe next wrote Banana Computer a letter, letting them know that he was fed
up with the product and wanted nothing more to do with it. He stated in his letter
that while the iBreak worked great for a few days at a time, the constant problems
had made him lose faith in its reliability. Furthermore, it just is not worth very
much to him if he can only use it a few days out of every month due to the
lengthy repair service. He tactfully proposed to mail back the iBreak if Banana
Computer would agree to refund his purchase price and cost of shipping.
Otherwise, he warned, legal action would be his next step.
Banana responded with a letter of its own. The letter explained that because
Joe had clicked the "I agree" button during installation of the iBreak software, he
was bound by the terms of his warranty agreement.20 The letter explained that
Banana would gladly continue to honor the sole means of remedy he had agreed
to, which was to repair or replace the product, at Banana's option, for up to one
year. The letter further stated that Banana was under no obligation to offer him a
refund. 2' Finally, the letter advised that if Joe should decide to go to the trouble
and expense of hiring a lawyer, he should know that Banana has an army of very
good lawyers of its own and has a policy of aggressively defending all breach of
warranty actions. He was further put on notice that should he elect to go forward
with legal action, "Clause Ten" of the warranty agreement restricts him to
arbitration. Therefore, any suit he may attempt to file in state or federal court
would be tossed out.
B. Why Consumers Do Not Read
Most scholars agree that consumers like Joe in our hypothetical do not read
contracts of adhesion, in general, nor are they anymore likely to read them in
shrinkwrap agreements.22 Much has already been said to explain this
20 For the sake of this hypothetical, Banana knows that Joe clicked the "I agree"
button for two reasons. First, his product would not have functioned at all had the
installation process not been completed. Second, Joe's computer automatically registered
his warranty agreement with Banana over the Internet when he clicked the button.
21 On the facts of this hypothetical, such a request for refund made after the time for
rejection has passed amounts to the legally defined action of "revocation of acceptance."
Court's in Joe's jurisdiction do not allow revocation against a manufacturer who does not
sell the product directly to a consumer. See infra Part III.C. 1. While the Magnuson-Moss
Act provides consumers the right to a refund for excessive repairs of a consumer good,
the Act applies only to "Full Warranties," not the "Limited Warranty" at issue in the
hypothetical. See Flechtner, supra note 3, at 412-13 & n.36 (citing 15 U.S.C.
§ 2303(a)(2) (1995)).
22 Robert A. Hillman, A Tribute to Professor Joseph M. Perillo: Rolling Contracts,
71 FORDHAM L. REv. 743, 743 (2002) (referring to "the widely accepted fact that, for a
number of reasons, consumers typically do not read their standard forms."); see also id. at
747 n. 18 ("Virtually every scholar who has written about contracts of adhesion has
accepted the truth [that consumers do not read their forms], and the few empirical studies
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phenomenon and little more can be added here that will be of further use. To
provide the reader with a framework for understanding the plight of consumers
like Joe in the hypothetical, this section will simply provide two fairly
comprehensive summaries others have put forth explaining why consumers do
not read.
Robert A. Hillman summarizes some of the reasons that consumers do not
read boilerplate contracts of adhesion in the passage below:
The seller is familiar with the form, having spent lots of time and money using
and rewriting it. On the other hand, the consumer is not very interested in the
seller's form. Typically the consumer does not have much time to study the form,
nor the resources to shop for terms, a search that would usually prove fruitless
anyway. In addition, the consumer could not understand most of the language
even if she did read the form. The consumer also believes correctly that the
seller's agent is not going to bargain over the boilerplate. Moreover, the
consumer assumes nothing will go wrong with the product but, should it be
defective, the seller will remedy the problem. Finally, the consumer expects the
law to protect her from egregious terms. In short, the seller presents a form
largely incomprehensible to the consumer on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and the
consumer has good reason not to read the form.2 3
Clayton P. Gillette provides concurring analysis of the non-reading buyer
phenomenon in his article, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem. As the
excerpted passage below indicates, Gillette argues that a buyer's decision not to
read standard form contracts may be a perfectly rational decision:
Some recent literature attributes failure to read terms to cognitive heuristics that
either cause buyers to misestimate risks or otherwise prevent buyers from
assessing terms with comprehensive rationality. But failure to read may be
perfectly rational, especially given the inability to negotiate around terms, if the
buyer accurately predicts that the costs of review exceed its benefits. Even a
rational buyer who anticipates that a proposed contract does not fully internalize
purchaser interests, for instance, could fail to review terms if the buyer predicted
that transactional breakdowns to which disfavored terms apply are unlikely to
occur, especially where the buyer relies on branding or other reputational signals
to ensure quality. Similarly, rational buyers could forgo review if they believed
that disfavored terms cannot be negotiated. In that case, the buyer would be faced
with a take-it-or-leave-it proposition and would exercise the former option unless
that have been done have agreed. My survey reinforces the empirical work. Only 24 out
of 100 respondents (24%) indicated that they read the terms of rolling contracts.")
(internal citation omitted); Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts As An Agency Problem,
2004 Wis. L. REv. 679, 680 (2004) ("[Clommentators agree that buyers, or the vast
majority of them, do not read the terms presented to them by sellers.").
23 Hillman, supra note 22, at 746-47.
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the terms were expected to be both onerous and likely to be applied. Rational
buyers might also believe that sellers are likely to waive the disfavored term in
the event of a transactional breakdown, in which case there is little cause to
review them in advance. Finally, rational buyers who believe that courts will
refuse to enforce terms that are exploitive have little reason to consider those
terms ex ante.
2 4
Given the force of the arguments above, together with the wide agreement
that consumers simply do not read boilerplate,25 little ground can be gained by
arguing, from an equitable standpoint, that consumers deserve whatever they get
by not reading. If, as Judge Easterbrook contends, "[c]ompetent adults are bound
by [their acceptance of] such documents, read or unread"26 then consumers at
least should be afforded every opportunity to revoke their acceptance when the
conditions of U.C.C. § 2-608 are met. However, this option is not available to
consumers in some jurisdictions when the tripartite rolling contract device has
been employed by the manufacturer.2 7 The following section describes in detail
how tripartite rolling contracts are structured and how they came to be and
provides inescapable evidence indicating that rolling contracts appear to have
become a fixture in the modem usage of trade. First, though, the following
section, Part III, will describe the origin and expansion of rolling contract doctrine
within the Seventh Circuit. Part Ill also analyzes the jurisdictional adoption of the
Seventh Circuit's approach nationally, demonstrating that at a minimum, it must
be agreed that Judge Easterbrook's decision in ProCD has become intractably
interwoven into the jurisprudence of twenty-first century sales disputes.
IH. TRIPARTITE ROLLING CONTRACTS
Judge Easterbrook's decision in ProCD v. Zeidenberg28 held that a software
manufacturer may enforce contract terms against an end-purchaser where these
terms are bundled inside the shrink-wrapped package of goods and are unread
prior to the exchange of money and goods. It is important to note at the outset
that, while the case itself has become famous and generated voluminous legal
commentary, it is most correctly viewed as supporting the status quo rather than
mandating a radical departure from it. With ProCD, Easterbrook merely put his
imprimatur on the already well established usage of trade in the software
industry.2 9
24 Gillette, supra note 22, at 680.
25 See supra note 22.
26 Hill v. Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997).
27 See infra Part IV for a discussion of this topic.
28 86 F.3d 1447, 1452-53 (7th Cir. 1996).
29 "Shrinkwrap licenses have been a fixture in computer software transactions for
some time. Exactly who first used a shrinkwrap license provision in a software
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Before going any further, a word on terminology is in order. In ProCD, Judge
Easterbrook colloquially referred to the agreement formed as being a "shrinkwrap
license." 30 Cyberspace equivalents to such shrinkwrap agreements have cropped
up with the increasing popularity of sales over the Internet in the time since
ProCD. These agreements are known variously as "click-wrap," where a buyer
assents to terms by clicking a button in the software interface, "browse-wrap,"
where buyer's assent is found simply by loading an HTML page in a browser;
and a variety of other labels, which invariably end in the word "wrap" and are
descriptive of other means of post-sale authentication including email, E-sign, and
biometric authentication.31 For the sake of convenience, the term "shrinkwrap
agreement" will be used herein to apply to all such equivalent means of assent,
affirmative or otherwise. Shrinkwrap (and cyber equivalents thereof) agreements
have also been labeled "rolling contracts" because their terms are agreed to by the
buyer after the money and goods have changed hands. 32 A particular species of
the rolling contract genus, identified herein as "tripartite rolling contract,"
describes the relationship formed among the producers, sellers, and buyers of
goods in the twenty-first century usage of trade. In a tripartite rolling contract, the
manufacturer and end-purchaser are not in privity of sales contract but depend on
at least one intermediary in the chain of distribution, such as a retailer, to pass
along the shrinkwrapped terms of their deal.3 3 It is this tripartite variety of rolling
transaction is a fact lost in the arcane mists of computer history. Certainly, they were a
feature of the licensing landscape by the early 1980s." Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual
Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1239, 1241 & n.5 (1995).
30 As Judge Easterbrook explains in ProCD:
The "shrinkwrap license" gets its name from the fact that retail software packages
are covered in plastic or cellophane "shrinkwrap," and some vendors ... have
written licenses that become effective as soon as the customer tears the wrapping
fiom the package. Vendors prefer "end user license," but we use the more common
term.
Id. at 1449.
31 See Michael Dessent, Browse- Wraps, Click- Wraps and Cyberlaw: Our Shrinking
(Wrap) World, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 1, 6-8 (2002).
32 See, e.g., Hillman, supra note 22, at 744.
33 This Note focuses on the rights and obligations of the party at the beginning and
end of the chain of distribution, the manufacturer and end purchaser respectively.
Obviously, more than one "middle-man" between the manufacturer and end purchaser
could and do exist in modem commerce. However, for the topics discussed herein, no
conceptual difference exists between the three-party chain and a more complicated model
involving more than one intervening party. What is meant to be distinguished by the term
"tripartite rolling contract," and therefore not addressed herein, is a shrinkwrap
agreement formed as part of a direct sales transaction between the manufacturer and end-
purchaser.
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contract that was at issue in ProCD and which will be the focus the remainder of
this Note.
A. "Let's Roll": ProCD v. Zeidenberg and Rolling Contracts
The controversy in ProCD arose from defendant Matthew Zeidenberg's retail
purchase and subsequent commercial use of a consumer software product named
SelectPhoneg.34 The manufacturer of this product, plaintiff ProCD, Inc.,
prohibited the sharing of the software's information to other parties through use of
a "shrinkwrap license," 35 notice of which was provided on the outside of the
box.36 After triggering the mode of acceptance specified in the license,
37
Zeidenberg violated the single use restriction by reselling the data over the
Intemet.38 The central issue in the case was whether or not shrinkwrap licenses
are enforceable.39
The district court analyzed the two leading cases on the enforceability of
shrinkwrap licenses, Step-Saver Data Systems 4° and Arizona Retail Systems,
4 1
The recently promulgated 2003 Amendments to Article 2 warranty provisions,
section 2-313 and new sections 2-313(A) and (B), for the first time codify the tripartite
rolling contract relationship in Article 2. See infra Part III.C; see also infra Part III.B
(codification of tripartite rolling contracts in UCITA). The conceptual framework for a
collection of related but legally distinct sales and warranty transactions also finds support
in Professor Harry M. Flechtner's article, supra note 3, at 452-55.
34 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450.
35 The restriction was worded as follows, "[y]ou will not make the Software or the
Listings in whole or in part available to any other user in any networked or time-shared
environment, or transfer the Listings in whole or in part to any computer other than the
computer used to access the Listings." ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 645
(W.D. Wis. 1996).
36 See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449. The full terms of this license agreement in ProCD
were not printed on the outside of the product's box, although the box did indicate that
restrictions on use were included inside. See ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 645. The full terms
of the license agreement were provided in the printed "User Guide" included inside the
product's packaging. Id. at 644. Additionally, notices and warnings related to the use
restrictions appeared on Zeidenberg's computer screen when the software was installed
and when the software application was run. Id. at 645.
37 The shrinkwrap agreement specified the buyer's mode of acceptance-"using the
software or accessing the listings contained on the discs," as well as the buyer's mode of
rejection--"promptly return all copies of the software, listings..., discs, and User Guide
to the place where you [the buyer] obtained it." Id. at 644. Zeidenberg triggered
acceptance by using the software to download data from the Select Phone® discs to his
own database. See id. at 645.
38 See id. at 645.
39 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1448.
40 Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 91 (3d Cir. 1991).
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and reached the same result these cases had reached: the shrinkwrap license was
unenforceable. 42 The district court concluded that the shrinkwrap terms were not
included with the offer for sale and therefore represent either a proposed
modification under U.C.C. § 2-209,43 as Arizona Retail Systems had found, or
was a proposed addition under U.C.C. § 2-207,44 as the Step-Saver court had
decided. 45 Since the district court found that these new terms were not assented to
by the purchaser, it found that the terms were unenforceable regardless of which
section of the U.C.C. is applied.46
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, Judge Easterbrook overruled the district
court and stated unequivocally, "[s]hrinkwrap licenses are enforceable unless
their terms are objectionable on grounds applicable to contracts in general (for
example, if they violate a rule of positive law, or if they are unconscionable). 47
Judge Easterbrook swept the analysis of the prior cases aside, reasoning that Step-
Saver's § 2-207 analysis was "irrelevant" because the instant case was not a
"battle-of-the-forms" situation,48 and that Arizona's holding under § 2-209 was
not persuasive because that court had not reached the question.49
Easterbrook grounded his analysis instead on basic rules of contract
formation under U.C.C. § 2-204 and the definitions of acceptance and rejection of
goods under U.C.C. §§ 2-606 and 2-602 respectively. 50 He reasoned that since a
vendor, as master of the offer, may invite acceptance in the manner of his
choosing, ProCD's choice to invite acceptance through use of the software was
41 Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 759 (D. Ariz.
1993).
42 ProCD, 908 F. Supp at 652, 655.
43 U.C.C. § 2-209 (1999) ("Modification, Rescission and Waiver").
44 U.C.C. § 2-207 (1999) ("Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation").
45 ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 655.
46 Id.
47 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449.
48 Id. at 1452 ("Step-Saver is a battle-of-the-forms case, in which the parties
exchange incompatible forms and a court must decide which prevails .... Our case has
only one form; U.C.C. § 2-207 is irrelevant."). Several commentators have argued that
Easterbrook was wrong in stating that § 2-207 only applies to "battle of the forms"
situations. See, e.g., Hillman, supra note 22, at 753 ("Easterbrook was plainly wrong
about section 2-207's applicability. Nothing in the text of the section limits it to
transactions involving more than one form.") (footnote omitted); Kristin Johnson
Hazelwood, Let the Buyer Beware: The Seventh Circuit's Approach to Accept-or-Return
Offers, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1287, 1320-23 (1998).
49 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452 ("Arizona Retail Systems did not reach the question,
because the court found that the buyer knew the terms of the license before purchasing
the software.").
50 Id. at 1452-53.
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valid under U.C.C. § 2-204.51 Since Zeidenberg had an opportunity to inspect the
goods and failed to make an effective rejection under § 2-602(1), he accepted the
goods by default under the rule of § 2-606(1)(b). 52
Among his supporting rationales, Judge Easterbrook suggested it would be
futile to force product manufacturers to print entire contract terms in "microscopic
type" on the outside of product packaging. 53 He further argued that
"[c]ompetition among venders, not judicial revision of a package's contents is
how consumers are protected in a market economy." 54 Besides, Easterbrook
pointed out, "[t]ransactions in which the exchange of money precedes the
communication of detailed terms are common."55 Some anecdotal examples
provided by Easterbrook of "money now, terms later" transactions include the
following sales: insurance contracts, airline tickets, concert tickets, prescription
drugs, and most relevantly, online sales in the software industry.
56
B. "Rolling Down Hill ": Seventh Circuit Expansion of the ProCD
Doctrine
Six months after deciding the ProCD opinion, Judge Easterbrook heard
arguments in another dispute over the enforceability of shrinkwrap terms, Hill v.
Gateway 2000.57 Though the Hills ordered their product, a Gateway computer,
directly from the manufacturer, and thus no tripartite relationship was created, the
Hill case is useful for our present discussion because of Judge Easterbrook's
explicit comment on the scope of his earlier ProCD opinion.
At issue in the Hill case was the enforceability of an arbitration clause
included inside of the product packaging. The terms of that shrinkwrap agreement
stated that the customer agrees to be bound unless he returned the computer
within 30 days.58 After 30 days had passed, the Hills filed suit in federal court,
where a sympathetic federal judge refused to enforce the arbitration clause.59
51 Id. at 1452.
52 Id. at 1452-53.
53 See id. at 1451.
54 Id. at 1453.
55 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451 (7th Cir. 1996).
56 Id. It is worth noting that Easterbrook apparently took judicial notice of nearly all
of his examples. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 585 (1991), one of
the few cases Easterbrook does rely upon, has subsequently been superseded by
Congress. See 46 U.S.C. APP. § 183c(a) (2000) (declaring it unlawful for a passenger
vessel to insert a forum selection clause on a consumer ticket); see also Yang v. M/V
Minas Leo, No. 94-15168, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 2235, at *4 (9th Cir. Jan. 26, 1996).
57 105 F.3d 1147, 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
58 Id. at 1148.
59 Id.
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Hence, on Gateway's appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the Hills were in the difficult
position of arguing before Judge Easterbrook that his prior decision in ProCD v.
Zeidenberg should be limited to its facts and that the unread shrinkwrapped
arbitration clause at issue should not be enforced. 60 Perhaps not surprisingly, the
outcome of Hill had the adverse effect of expanding rather than limiting the scope
of the ProCD doctrine of enforcing shrinkwrapped agreements.
The Hills made several attempts to limit the holding of ProCD, all of which
were rejected by the Seventh Circuit. The Hills first attempted to limit ProCD to
sales of software only. Easterbrook's retort: "where's the sense in that?" 61 Judge
Easterbrook explained that "ProCD is about the law of contract, not the law of
software.' 62 He went on to recite the same non-software related instances of
"money now, terms later" agreements he had provided in ProCD63 and again
rationalized that "[p]ractical considerations" such as the awkwardness of oral or
written notification of the full terms of the agreement prior to shipment "support
allowing vendors to enclose the full legal terms with their products. ' 64 Indeed,
Judge Easterbrook argued, "[c]onsumers as a group are better off when vendors
skip [such] costly and ineffectual steps...."65
In their second attempt to limit ProCD's holding, the Hills argued that
ProCD should be limited to executory contracts such as the license agreement
disputed in ProCD.66 Judge Easterbrook responded that this argument was legally
wrong because the issue was one of formation not one of performance and that
ProCD's holding did not depend on whether the agreement is characterized as a
sale or a license. 67
Next the Hills argued that the defendant in ProCD, Matthew Zeidenberg, was
a merchant and that the ProCD doctrine should not be extended to consumer
transactions such as the purchase in which the Hills engaged.68 The Hills
premised the distinction between merchant and consumer on their reading of
U.C.C. § 2-207, the very section Judge Easterbrook had ruled "irrelevant" in
ProCD.69 Judge Easterbrook clarified that ProCD reaches "merchants and
60 Id. at 1148-49.
61 Id. at 1149.
62 Id.
63 See Hill v. Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997). ("Payment
preceding the revelation of full terms is common for air transportation, insurance, and
many other endeavors.").
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 1150.
69 U.C.C. § 2-207 (1999). Had U.C.C. § 2-207 been applied in Hill, then the ProCD
case could have been distinguished in the following manner. U.C.C. § 2-207(2) provides
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consumers alike," and reiterated that "a vendor may propose that a contract of
sale be formed, not in the store (or over the phone) with the payment of money
... but after the consumer has had a chance to inspect both the item and the
terms." 70
A final unsuccessful attempt by the Hills to distinguish ProCD, which again
resulted adversely in an extension of ProCD's holding, was a factual distinction
in the notice provided to the buyers in the two cases. The box in ProCD gave
notice of an enclosed agreement, the Gateway box did not.71 Calling this
difference "fimctional, not legal," Judge Easterbrook found that the Hills "knew..
. that the carton would include some important terms" because of Gateway's
advertisements. 72 Had they elected to do so the Hills could have discovered the
details of these terms before ordering the computer either by requesting the
vendor to send them a copy as required by the Magnuson-Moss Act73 or by
consulting public sources such as magazines and websites.74 Having chosen not
to avail themselves of either of these options, Judge Easterbrook reasoned, the
Hills were still afforded a final method by which they could evaluate the terms of
the agreement: "inspect the documents after the product's delivery" and
presumably return the goods if the terms were objectionable. 75
Under the Seventh Circuit's approach it appears to matter not whether the
mode of acceptance was triggered intentionally by the buyer. Such a requirement
of intentionality would presume that the buyer actually read the contract and
understood the significance of acting in such a way so as to trigger the mode of
acceptance. However, the Hill opinion explicitly rejects any duty to read in the
formation of shrinkwrapped agreements.76 While this position has obvious
practical appeal in lowering transaction costs, it is difficult to reconcile with the
usual requirement that contract formation requires a "meeting of minds. ' 77 For
that "additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition." In a consumer
transaction U.C.C. § 2-207(3) applies, restricting the terms of the agreement to "those
terms on which the writings of the parties agree" together with terms supplied by the gap-
filling provisions of the U.C.C. where the parties' writings do not agree. However,
Easterbrook was in no mood to revisit the logic of his earlier holding. He reiterates in Hill
that, "when there is only one form, '§ 2-207 is irrelevant."' See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150.
70 Hill, 105 F.3d. at 1150.
71 See id. at 1150.
7 2 See id. at 1150.
73 15 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1)(A) (2000).
74 Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150.
75 See id. at 1150.
76 See id. at 1149 ("Competent adults are bound by such [approve-or-return]
documents, read or unread.").
77 "One of the essential elements for the formation of a contract, other than a
contract implied in law or quasi contract, is a manifestation of assent by the parties to the
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example, even in "battle of the forms" situations, terms of a form contract not
agreed to by the parties are excised from the agreement and replaced with filler
terms elsewhere stated in the U.C.C.78 Thus, the Seventh Circuit's approach in
Hill represents a remarkable departure from the touchtone of mutual agreement in
the enforcement of specific written provisions.
It is also worth noting that, unlike the buyer in ProCD, the Hills' lack of
action, rather than any affirmative step on their part, triggered the acceptance
clause of the agreement. In this case Judge Easterbrook held, "[b]y keeping the
computer beyond 30 days, the Hills accepted Gateway's offer, including the
arbitration clause."'79 Thus after Hill, non-action can trigger acceptance in the
same manner that action can.
Hence, the Hill case clarifies and extends the ProCD doctrine to enforce
shrinkwrap agreements, and therefore tripartite rolling contracts, in the following
cases: (1) sales of all goods, whether software or some other product; (2) all
shrinkwrap contract terms, whether they be executory or non-executoy; (3) sales
involving transactions with consumers in addition to those involving only
merchants; (4) sales where specific written terms are included in the contract
regardless of actual notice or evidence of the intent of the parties to agree to these
terms; and (5) sales where formation is triggered by either non-action or some
affirmative step.
C. "Roll With It Baby": Rolling Contracts Are Here to Stay
1. Jurisdictional Adoption Evidences the Traction of the Seventh Circuit's
Approach Under Currently Enacted Article 2
Generally speaking, the enforcement of rolling contracts such as those upheld
in ProCD and Hill continues to be the law in the Seventh Circuit80 and has been
terms thereof. It is essential that both parties assent to the same thing in the same sense
and that their minds meet on the essential terms and conditions." Interstate Industries,
Inc. v. Barclay Indus., Inc., 540 F.2d 868, 871 (7th Cir. 1976) (quoting 1 WILLISTON
SALES § 7-2 (4th ed. 1973)).
78 See U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (1999); see, e.g., Std. Bent Glass Corp. v. Glassrobots Oy,
333 F.3d 440, 445 (3d Cir. 2003). As discussed previously, Easterbrook expressly rejects
the applicability of U.C.C. § 2-707 to shrinkwrapped agreements. See supra note 47 and
accompanying text.
79Id. at 1150.
80 The Seventh Circuit appears to be confident in its decision and courts here
consistently upheld ProCD and Hill, discussed at length in Parts III. A and B
respectively. See, e.g., Mudd-Lyman Sales & Serv. Corp. v. United Parcel Serv., 236 F.
Supp. 2d 907, 911 (N.D. I11. 2002) (follows Hill and ProCD without comment and
enforces a shrink-wrapped limitation of liability clause); Kaczmarek v. Microsoft Corp.,
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adopted by a majority of jurisdictions to consider the issue. As discussed in more
detail below, courts within the jurisdiction of seven other federal circuit courts of
appeal appear to favor the Seventh Circuit approach in whole or in part. Of these
adopting jurisdictions, courts within the First and Second Circuit are the strongest
supporters. The Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits as a group are generally
supportive but have fewer cases on point. The Third Circuit adopts the Seventh
Circuit approach with the reservation that actual assent to shrink-wrapped
provisions be proven, as opposed to mere constructive assent through use, as
found in ProCD,81 or constructive assent through inaction, as found in Hill.82 The
final group of jurisdictions that can be said to generally adopt the Seventh Circuit
approach are courts within the Ninth Circuit. As will be discussed, however,
courts located within the Ninth Circuit are far from uniform in their handling of
the issues. Federal district courts within the Tenth Circuit represent the strongest
anti-rolling contract sentiment. As will be discussed below, these district courts
expressly reject the Seventh Circuit approach. Rounding out the survey of U.S.
jurisdictions, and as discussed in more detail below, the scarcity of case law on-
point within the District of Columbia and the Fourth and Fifth Circuits makes it
difficult to predict how a court sitting within these jurisdictions would decide a
rolling contracts case.
Beginning with states within the jurisdiction of the First Circuit Court of
Appeals, federal and state courts in Massachusetts appear to firmly adopt Seventh
Circuit doctrine espoused in ProCD and Hill regarding the enforcement of rolling
contracts. 83 Additionally, the law of New Hampshire was interpreted by the Sixth
39 F. Supp. 2d 974, 975 (N.D. I11. 1999) (following Hill and ProCD and enforcing a
disclaimer packaged with software). The only exception since ProCD appears to be a
wayward California district court that interpreted Indiana law in refusing to enforce a
forum selection clause in a shrink-wrapped agreement. See Morgan Labs. Inc. v. Micro
Data Base Sys., Inc., No. C96-3998, 1997 WL 258886, *2, *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 1997)
(applying Indiana law) (refusing to enforce a forum selection clause shrink-wrapped with
software because the preexisting contractual relationship was integrated).
81 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
82 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
83 See I.Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 338 (D.
Mass 2002) (extending "pay now, terms later" to clicking "I Agree" on a computer);
Green Book Int'l Corp. v. Inunity Corp., 2 F. Supp. 2d 112, 112 (D. Mass. 1998)
(enforcing a shrink-wrap distribution license without comment in denying a preliminary
injunction); 1-A Equip. Co. v. Icode, Inc., No. 1460, 2003 WL 549913, at *2 (Mass. App.
Ct. Feb. 21, 2003) (applying Virginia law) ("We adopt the rationale of [Hill and
ProCD]."); GSI Lumonics, Inc. v. BioDiscovery, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 99, 105 (D. Mass.
2000) (assuming the validity of shrinkwrap license without comment).
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Circuit in accord with Hill.84 Conversely, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
distinguished ProCD in its sole opinion on this issue.85
Precedent within the Second Circuit also strongly favors rolling contracts
with few exceptions. At the federal level, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has
cited ProCD with approval86 and the Southern District of New York has upheld
the enforceability of "browse-wrap", the cyberspace equivalent of shrinkwrap. 87
Legions of New York state court opinions from the Appellate Division all the
way down to trial courts repeatedly affirm that ProCD and Hill are adopted as a
matter of New York law.88 The sole notable exception within New York appears
to be a maverick New York City Civil Court that expressly criticized and rejected
ProCD.89 Finally, authority in Connecticut state court accepts the Seventh Circuit
approach without comment. 90
84 See Micro Data Base Sys., Inc. v. Dharma Sys., Inc., 148 F.3d 649, 654-55 (7th
Cir. 1998) (applying New Hampshire law) (holding that under N.H. law custom software
was a good under the U.C.C. and that the buyer had accepted the good by failing to reject
within a reasonable time).
85 See Defontes v. Dell Computers Corp., No. C.A. PC 03-2636, 2004 WL 253560,
at *7 (R.I. Jan. 29, 2004) (distinguishing ProCD and stating that the "Terms and
Conditions Agreement also hinges on whether a reasonable person would have known
that return of the product would serve as rejection of those terms.").
86 See Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 850 (2d Cir. 1997)
(citing ProCD approvingly both for copyright misappropriation and, in dicta, for
enforceability of shrinkwrap);
87 See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(enforcing a "browse-wrap" agreement and reasoning that by accessing the website a
person assented to terms, whether read or not).
88 Moore v. Microsoft Corp., 741 N.Y.S.2d 91, 92 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) ("[T]he
defendant offered a contract that the plaintiff accepted by using the software after having
an opportunity to read the license at leisure."); Scott v. Bell Atl. Corp., 726 N.Y.S.2d 60,
64 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001), aff'd as modified by Goshen v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New
York, 774 N.E.2d 1190, 1190 (N.Y. 2002) (finding contract enforceable regardless of
actual notice pursuant to ProCD and Hill but adds that "click-wrap" is acceptable where
assent is required for installation); Against Gravity Apparel, Inc. v. Quarterdeck Corp.,
699 N.Y.S.2d 368, 369-70 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (enforcing shrink-wrapped disclaimer
without comment); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 572 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1998) (adopting ProCD and Hill, stating "we agree with their rationale" and
enforces an arbitration clause given after payment stating, "Transactions involving 'cash
now, terms later' have become commonplace."); Great Am. Ins. Agency v. United Parcel
Serv., 772 N.Y.S.2d 486, 490 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) ("[A]cquiescing to a license upon the
opening of a shrink-wrapped UPS software package and the installation of the software
has also been found sufficient for contract purposes"); Levy v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 33
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1060, 1062 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997) (rejecting the applicability of
U.C.C. § 2-207 per ProCD).
89 See Licitra v. Gateway, Inc., 734 N.Y.S.2d 389, 389 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2001). After
accepting that ProCD and Hill are followed in N.Y. to establish contract formation, this
court refuses to enforce an arbitration clause, stating:
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Courts within the Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits appear to generally
favor the enforceability of shrinkwrap agreements, though courts in these
jurisdictions have spoken with far less frequency than those within the First and
Second Circuits. For example, in addition to the Sixth Circuit opinion discussed
above, 91 opinions by an Ohio state Appellate Court and a Tennessee District
Court lean toward the Seventh Circuit approach.92
Like the Sixth Circuit courts, the courts within the Eighth Circuit also appear
to generally lean towards following the ProCD doctrine.93 Within the Eleventh
Circuit, two leading cases prior to ProCD, Arizona Retail Systems and Step-Saver
Data Systems, both applied Georgia law in finding shrink-wrapped contracts
unenforceable.94 However, in the only reported decision since ProCD by a court
Accepting these holdings as being applicable, if the defendant, as a term and
condition of filing a claim, required the consumer to sing "0 Sole Mio" in Yiddish
while standing on his or her head in Macy's window, only Mandy Patinkin would
qualify to object to the receipt of defective equipment. This cannot be so.. .All
terms of the 'Agreement' should not be enforced merely because the consumer
retains the equipment for 30 days after receipt, especially because it is unclear when
the 30-day period to protest begins.
See id. at 391-92.
90 See Vacco v. Microsoft Corp., 793 A.2d 1048, 1062 & n.26 (Conn. Super. Ct.
2002) (enforcing a 'money now, terms later' transaction without reasoning).
91 See supra note 84.
92 See Paragon Networks, Int'l. v. Macola, Inc., No. 9-99-2, 1999 WL 280385, at *3
(Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 28, 1999) (enforcing a 90-day limitation in the shrink-wrapped
warranty of software advertised as being Year 2000 compliant where complainant failed
to argue lack of assent to the warranty terms at trial); see also McDonald's Corp. v. Shop
At Home, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 801, 801 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) (implying generally the
enforceability of a shrink-wrap license agreement between company and it's franchisees
dictating the terms of distribution of certain promotional items while determining no
license existed on other grounds).
93 See i-Systems, Inc. v. Softwares, Inc., No. 02-1951 JRTFLN 2004 WL 742082,
*6-*7 (D. Minn. Mar. 29, 2004) (emphasizing notice of shrink-wrapped terms and citing
ProCD as an example of an enforceable shrink-wrap agreement in denying a motion to
dismiss, without deciding enforceability); Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc. v. Ottawa Plant
Food, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1034-35 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (enforcing a "limited label
license" which restricted the resale of a strain of corn).
94 Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 765 (D. Ariz.
1993) (applying Georgia law) (holding that a shrink-wrapped license is a proposal to
modify a contract and rejecting the unaccented to provisions under U.C.C. § 2-209);
Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 105 (D. Pa. 1991) (applying
Georgia law) (refusing to enforce a "box-top" agreement contained on software, stating
that "[w]hen a disclaimer is not expressed until after the contract is formed, UCC § 2-207
governs the interpretation of the contract, and, between merchants, such disclaimers, to
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actually within the Eleventh Circuit, a Florida Court upheld shrink-wrapped
provisions.95
General acceptance of the Seventh Circuit approach, though with some
reservations, is evidenced by opinions with the Third Circuit. The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals held a shrink-wrap agreement unenforceable in the pre-ProCD
opinion of Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology.96 Since ProCD,
courts within the Third Circuit have continued to look for express assent to
shrink-wrapped terms in determining their enforceability and have applied U.C.C.
§ 2-207 in true "battle of the forms" situations involving shrink-wrapped
agreements.97 However, courts within the Third Circuit have indicated their
approval of ProCD and Hill on several occasions98 and none has rejected ProCD
on all fours.
the extent they materially alter the party's agreement, are not incorporated into the
[party's] agreement.")
95 See Management Computer Controls, Inc. v. Charles Perry Const., Inc., 743 So.
2d 627, 631-32 (Fla. Ct. App. 1999) (enforcing shrink-wrapped choice-of-law provisions
referenced by sales agreement without comment).
96 Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 105 (3d Cir. 1991)
(applying Georgia law) (refusing to enforce a "box-top" agreement contained on
software, stating that "[w]hen a disclaimer is not expressed until after the contract is
formed, UCC § 2-207 governs the interpretation of the contract, and, between merchants,
such disclaimers, to the extent they materially alter the party's agreement, are not
incorporated into the party's agreement.").
97 See CEGG, Inc. v. Magic Software Enters., Inc., 51 Fed. Appx. 359, 363-64 (3d
Cir. 2002) (While upholding summary judgment, the court enforced the terms of a
shrink-wrapped evaluation-software agreement and dropped terms written on the
purchase order for the final version of the software. The court used U.C.C. § 2-207 to
analyze the case and found the customer's purchase order for the full version of the
software, which included a provision for unlimited use of the evaluation software, was a
material alteration of the terms of the evaluation software, which became effective when
the software was installed per the shrink-wrapped agreement.); Greenfield v. Twin Vision
Graphics, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 2d 358, 375 (D.N.J. 2003) (enforcing shrinkwrap agreement
and distinguishing Step-Saver where customer manifested assent to post-sale terms by
signature).
98 See Peerless Wall & Window Coverings, Inc. v. Synchronics, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d
519, 527 (W.D. Pa. 2000) (stating the reasoning in ProCD is "insightful" in dicta only
and enforcing a shrink-wrap disclaimer on the grounds that the party expressly assented);
Info. Handling Servs. v. LRP Publ'ns., Inc., No. 00-1859, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14531,
at *5-*6 (D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2000) ("I can see no reason not to enforce the contract...
Defendant.. .was free to reject it and return the CD-ROM disc to IHS. Defendant chose
not to do so, and therefore is bound by its terms."); Westendorf v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,
No. 16913, 2000 WL 307369, at *3 (Del. Ch. Mar. 16, 2000) (The court cites Hill while
enforcing a "pay now, terms later" arbitration agreement contained in an internet services
Terms of Use. The court then applies that agreement to the purchase of a computer,
stating it is a "related purchase" by meaning of the ISP contract.); Rinaldi v. Iomega
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The Ninth Circuit is somewhat of a mixed bag, with some courts expressly
adopting and even extending ProCD while others limit its doctrine. Washington
state courts were some of the first to adopt ProCD within the Ninth Circuit and
have reaffirmed this doctrine recently.99 Recent opinions of the Central District of
California similarly demonstrate its support of the Seventh Circuit approach,100
while the Southern District, in an early case, required actual notice for "money
now, terms later" agreements.' 0 ' Interestingly, the Northern District of California
has repeatedly enforced shrink-wrapped End User License Agreements (EULA)
against software resellers despite lack of actual notice (and the fact that resellers
are not "end users") while the Central District has refused to do so. 10 2 In a final
twist in Ninth Circuit law on shrink-wrapped agreements, there is a split of
authority with regard to the enforceability of "browse-wrap" agreements where an
Corp., No. 98C-064-RRC, 1999 WL 1442014, at *3-*5, *7 (Del. Super. Ct. 1999)
(discussing ProCD and Hill approvingly and enforcing a conspicuously placed shrink-
wrapped disclaimer presented after initial contract).
99 See Puget Sound Fin., L.L.C. v. Unisearch, Inc., 47 P.3d 940, 943 (Wash. 2002)
(holding that terms contained on the invoice and on the search reports purchased by the
customer were enforceable); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 970
P.2d 803, 809 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) ("We find the Seventh Circuit's reasoning
persuasive .... ).
100 See Bischoff v. DirecTV, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1105 (C.D. Ca. 2002)
(citing ProCD and Hill while enforcing an arbitration agreement received long after
payment for services); Lozano v. AT&T Wireless, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1073 (C.D. Cal.
2002) (enforcing an arbitration clause in a "Welcome Guide" and accepting terms after
transaction).
101 See Microstar v. Formgen, Inc., 942 F. Supp. 1312, 1317-18 (S.D. Cal. 1996)
(limiting ProCD by emphasizing actual notice of the contractual provisions in shrink-
wrapped agreements) affd in part, rev'd in part, Micro Star v. Formgen Inc., 154 F.3d
1107, 1107 (9th Cir. 1998) (failing to discuss the shrink-wrapped agreement).
102 Compare Adobe Sys. Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1090-
91 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (using the terms of a shrink-wrapped EULA to find a license
agreement with the reseller of that software, although reseller is not an end user); with
Softman Products Co., LLC v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1082, 1084-88,
nn.6 & 12 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (finding that boxed software is a good, not a license for
purposes of a reseller and a EULA is not applicable to a reseller of software because the
reseller has no notice of its terms and therefore cannot assent to its terms) Finally, the
court distinguished One Stop Micro, supra, as involving the opening, alteration, and
resealing of Adobe's product.); with Adobe Systems, Inc. v. Stargate Software Inc., 216
F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1056-60 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (reaffirming the analysis in One Stop Micro,
supra, finding a license agreement against the reseller based on the contract signed by the
reseller's vendor and the EULA).
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Intemet visitor is constructively assumed to assent to the terms of a web-page by
virtue of his use of the site.10 3
Courts within the Tenth Circuit represent the strongest opposition to the
ProCD and Hill opinions. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has not spoken on
the issue, Federal District Courts in Kansas and Utah have consistently rejected
the Seventh Circuit's approach and have refused to enforce shrink-wrapped
agreements. 10 4 No state supreme court within the Tenth Circuit has yet addressed
the issue.
The final category of jurisdictions is that for which the enforceability of
rolling contracts has little or no case precedent. With so few cases on point, no
clear indication of the mood of courts in the District of Columbia or the Fourth
and Fifth Circuits is apparent. The District Court of Columbia Court of Appeals
has not spoken on the enforceability of rolling contracts per se. However, it has
upheld a forum selection clause appearing in a scroll box where a user clicked the
"Accept" button.105
While one state court within the First Circuit has interpreted Virginia law
(without citing Virginia or Fourth Circuit precedent) to expressly adopt the
rationale of ProCD and Hill,106 no court actually within the Fourth Circuit has
103 Compare Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV-99-7654, 2000 WL
525390, *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000) (refusing to extend "shrink-wrap" analysis to
"browse wrap" situations, and dismissing a breach of contract action); with Pollstar v.
Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 981 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (referencing positively the
policy considerations of ProCD, proposes the extension of "shrink-wrap" license analysis
to a "browse wrap" license and accordingly refuses to dismiss a claim because the
agreement "may be arguably valid and enforceable."); see also Specht v. Netscape
Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 30-31 (2d Cir. 2002) (applying California law)
(finding that a "browse wrap" agreement requires that the reasonably prudent offeree be
made aware of its terms so as to manifest assent and refusing to enforce an arbitration
agreement).
104 See Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1339 (D. Kan. 2000)
(holding an arbitration clause contained in documents shipped inside product packaging
unenforceable, noted the analytical deficiency of ProCD and Hill, and applied U.C.C.
§ 2-207 stating that the purchaser is the "master of the offer" and the seller must clearly
state any express conditions to the sale.); U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Orris, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d
1201, 1205 (D. Kan. 1998) (holding a "single use only" restriction on packaging for
surgical equipment unenforceable); Novell, Inc. v. Network Trade Ctr., Inc., 25 F. Supp.
2d 1218, 1229 (D. Utah 1997) (holding software to be a good, end users to be owners, not
licensees, and declaring shrink-wrap agreements unenforceable).
105 See Forrest v. Verizon Communications, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007, 1010-11 (D.C. Ct.
App 2002) (holding that scroll box containing a thirteen-page boiler plate contract was
adequate of notice of a forum selection clause where user clicked the "Agree" button to
order DSL service).
106 See I-A Equip. Co. v. Icode, Inc., No. 1460, 2003 WL 549913, at *2 (Mass.
App. Div. Feb. 21, 2003) (applying Virginia law) ("We adopt the rationale of [Hill and
ProCD].").
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done so in a reported case. In fact, at least one court within the Fourth Circuit held
that shrink-wrapped contracts containing arbitration agreements cannot be
constructively accepted by buyers.107
The only court within the Fifth Circuit to speak on the issue adopted "money
now, terms later" with regard to terms contained in a telephone equipment box
but carefully limited its holding to the facts of the case.10 8 This decision, however,
since this decision applied the law of Louisiana, the only U.S. state not to adopt
the U.C.C. Article 2, it is of little value in determining the adoption of ProCD
within the Fifth Circuit.
2. 2003 Amendments to U C. C. Warranty Provisions Would Expressly
Enforce Tripartite Rolling Contracts
The 2003 amendments to Article 2, now available to the states for
adoption, 10 9 offer insight into the direction the law may take in the near future
with regard to tripartite rolling contracts. The 2003 amendments to current U.C.C.
§ 2-313, covering express warranties, includes two new subsections. The first
subsection § 2-313A, "Obligation To Remote Purchaser Created By Record
Packaged With Or Accompanying Goods," specifies the rights and obligations
where a manufacturer passes along shrinkwrap agreements to the consumer via a
retailer. In other words, this subsection would expressly codify the enforcement of
tripartite rolling contracts or their functional equivalent under the code's slightly
altered terminology.
The new section 2-313A begins by labeling the parties to the tripartite
transaction. A new term, "immediate buyer," is defined as one who "enters into a
contract with the seller."' 10 The definition of "seller" is left substantively
unchanged by the Article 2 Amendments. It continues to be the entity that "sells
107 See Mattingly v. Hughes Elec. Corp., 810 A.2d 498, 506 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2002) (holding that a person cannot "constructively accept" an arbitration agreement as
part of the "change of terms" clause in a DirecTV® contract without regard for the actual
notice received by the customer.).
108 See O'Quinn v. Verizon Wireless, 256 F. Supp. 2d 512, 516 (M.D. La. 2003).
109 The Amendments to U.C.C. Article 2 were approved by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) and the American Law Institute
(ALl) in 2003. No state legislature has yet introduced a bill that would adopt the
amendments. See Uniform Law Commissioners: Amendments to UCC Articles 2 and 2A,
available at http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformactfactsheets/uniformacts-fs-
ucc22AO3.asp (last visited September 21, 2004). The amended text of Article 2 will be
referred to herein as "2003 Amendments," "the Amendments," or as being the "new"
Article 2. All references to U.C.C. sections not so designated refer to the version of
Article 2 currently enacted in all fifty states.
110 U.C.C. §§ 2-313(1), 2-313A(l)(a), & 2-313B(l)(a) (amended 2003).
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or contracts to sell goods."' In defining another new term, "remote purchaser,"
the amendments clarify how the parties in a tripartite rolling contract would be
labeled. A "remote purchaser" is "a person that buys or leases goods from an
immediate buyer or other person in the normal chain of distribution."'' 12 Thus, in
a typical retail transaction, the consumer is labeled a "remote purchaser," the
retailer is the "immediate buyer," and the remaining party to the transaction, the
manufacturer, must be the "seller."" 13
New section 2-313A(3) creates the statutory backing for the rolling contract
transaction in the sale of new goods,114 stating:
If a seller in a record packaged with or accompanying the goods makes an
affirmation of fact or promise that relates to the goods ... and the record is,
furnished to the remote purchaser, the seller has an obligation to the remote
purchaser that: (a) the goods will conform.. .and (b) the seller will perform the
remedial promise. 1 5
Use of the new term "obligation" in place of "express warranty" throughout
§§ 2-313, 2-313A, and 2-313B is meant to clarify that "no direct contract exists
between the seller and remote purchaser." This term thereby avoids "any
inference that that the basis of the bargain test is applicable here."' 16 Therefore,
the controversial "battle of the forms" issue that arose in the ProCD litigation is
sidestepped on a more surefooted basis than Judge Easterbrook's much criticized
pronouncement in ProCD that § 2-207 is somehow irrelevant when only one
form is involved. 117 The amended act would simply create the functional
equivalent of the sort of rolling contract envisioned by ProCD while avoiding the
baggage associated with the word warranty.
Remedies are governed by § 2-313A(5). This section affirms ProCD's
contention that a manufacturer (which would be "the seller" in a tripartite
transaction under the amended language) can limit the consumer ("remote
111 U.C.C. § 2-103(l)(o) (1999).
112 U.C.C. §§ 2-313A(l)(b), 2-313B(l)(b) (amended 2003).
113 U.C.C. § 2-313A Proposed Comment 2 confirms this understanding by
describing "the chain of distribution" as including the seller at the beginning of the chain,
the "public" at the end, and a retailer (along with potentially other parties) in the middle.
The comment proceeds to state, "A buyer or lessee from the retailer would qualify as a
remote purchaser and could invoke this section against.. .the manufacturer....." U.C.C.
§ 2-313A cmt. 2 (amended 2003).
114 U.C.C. § 2-313A(2) (amended 2003) is subject to § 2-313A(1) which restricts
the scope of § 2-313A to "new goods sold or leased ... in the normal chain of
distribution."
115 U.C.C. § 2-313A(2) (amended 2003).
116 U.C.C. § 2-313A (amended 2003) Proposed Official Comment 1.
117 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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purchaser")'s remedies through the shrinkwrap terms ("the record"). Such
"modification or limitation" is permissible so long as the terms that modify or
limit the remedy are either delivered at the time of purchase or are contained in
the record that creates the obligation (the duty akin to "express warranty")., " 8 A
consumer's rights in case of breach of the obligation, if not knocked out by the
manufacturer's limitation, include "the loss resulting in the ordinary course of
events as determined in any manner that is reasonable"1 19 along with "incidental
or consequential damages.. .but... not.. .lost profits."' 20
Thus, the 2003 Amendments codify the functional equivalent of the tripartite
rolling contract enforced in ProCD. In the language of the Act, the when a remote
purchaser triggers the mode of acceptance specified in a record delivered to him
from the seller via the immediate buyer, the seller's obligations and limitations
specified in the record become effective. 121
3. The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) Offers
Additional Support for Enforcing Tripartite Rolling Contracts in Software
Purchases
Where transactions in computer information are concerned, 122 rolling
contracts as envisioned by ProCD find support in the final draft of the Uniform
Computer Information Transactions Act (herein "UCITA"). The decade long
draft of UC1TA completed by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (herein "NCCUSL") in 2002 has had a troubled history 123
118 U.C.C. § 2-313A(4)(a) (amended 2003).
119 U.C.C. § 2-313A(4)(c) (amended 2003).
120 U.C.C. § 2-313A(4)(b) (amended 2003).
121 U.C.C. § 2-313A (amended 2003).
122 UCITA's scope is generally limited to computer information transactions. See
UCITA § 103(a) (2001). In transactions that mix goods and computer information, such
as the iBreak product in the hypothetical, UCITA's application is strictly limited to the
part that involves the computer information. See UCITA § 103(b) (2001).
123 The American Bar Association's (ABA) imprimatur on UCITA is conspicuously
lacking. When the two groups could not come to terms on the language of the act
NCCUSL removed UCITA from the ABA agenda on February 10, 2003. See NCCUSL
press release (February 10, 2003), available at http://www.nccusl.org/
nccusl/ucitaIUCITAABA 0203.pdf (last accessed March 16, 2003). Significant
opposition to UCITA was also voiced by some twenty-five state's attorney's general due
to concerns for consumer protection. See Erika E. Schinler, Comment, Trouble at the
Sausage Factory: Has the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act Been
Unjustly Stigmatized?, 75 TUL. L. REv. 507, 509, 525-31 (2000) (discussing the July
1999 letter of the twenty-five state's attorneys general attacking UCITA).
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and does not appear destined for wide adoption by the states any time soon.124
However, the sheer comprehensiveness of the proposed statute together with the
significance of its authoring body, NCCUSL, does provide some indication of the
direction the law is likely to move in the future with regard to tripartite rolling
contracts involving computer information.
The key provision of UCITA that would largely codify the ProCD's
authorization of rolling contracts is Section 208, "Adopting Terms of
Records."' 125 Under this provision, "a party," such as Joe Consumer in the
hypothetical, may adopt the terms of a standardized form, i.e. a shrinkwrap
agreement, by manifesting assent to it.126 This adoption may be made even "after
beginning performance or use," i.e. (having i.e. twice in two sentences is
awkward) well after Joe Consumer leaves the store with the product and
including his initial use of the iBreak software, so long as "the parties had reason
to know that their agreement would be represented in whole or part by a later
record to be agreed on and there would not be an opportunity to review the record
or a copy of it before performance or use begins."'127 Once adopted, the terms
become part of the contract whether or not the parties have knowledge or
understanding of them.128
IV. REVOCATION OF ACCEPTANCE
The previous section detailed the legal evolution of rolling contracts
involving three parties: a buyer, a retail seller, and a remote manufacturer. In this
section the same tripartite relationship is explored under the rubric of U.C.C. § 2-
608, Revocation of Acceptance. As will be shown, once the tripartite relationship
is established, buyers in many jurisdictions lose a right they have in traditional
bipartite transactions: the right to revoke acceptance.
A. If You Can't Reject 'Em, Revoke 'Em
Acceptance of goods is the signal legal moment when risk of loss and the
burden of going forward in a contract dispute shifts from the seller to the
124 To date, the only states to adopt UCITA are Maryland and Virginia. See VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-501.1 to 509.2 (Michie 2001 & Supp. 2004); MD. CODE ANN., COM.
LAW II §§ 22-101 to 22-816 (Supp. 2003).
125 UCITA § 208 Comment 3 makes clear that this section of the act is meant to
recognize that "many transactions involve a rolling or layered process" and specifically
adopts the rule of ProCD. UCITA § 208 cmt.3 (2001).
126 UCITA § 208(1) (2001).
127 UCITA § 208(2) (2001).
128 UCITA § 208(3) (2001).
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buyer. 129 Prior to this point the buyer is provided an opportunity to inspect the
goods130 and may reject them in whole or in part if the seller has failed to make a
perfect tender.131 A buyer who exercises his right to reject non-conforming goods
has only a duty to "hold [the goods] with reasonable care at the seller's
disposition for a time sufficient to permit the seller to remove them"'132 and to
avoid "any exercise of ownership."'1 33 Otherwise, "the buyer has no further
obligations to goods rightfully rejected."'134
Acceptance takes place once the buyer has had a reasonable opportunity to
inspect the goods and either signifies to the seller that the goods are conforming,
fails to make an effective rejection within a reasonable time, or does any act
inconsistent with the seller's ownership. 135 Hence in a typical case, as represented
by the hypothetical in Part II.A., supra, a buyer who allows the time for
rejection' 36 to lapse loses the right to reject the goods. 137 Default acceptance is
often triggered by holding the goods too long due to a consumer's instinct to work
with the warrantor of the product to rectify the situation. If this step proves
unfruitful, the consumer may no longer reject the goods.
Even after acceptance, the consumer may sue on the contract for breach of
warranty. The problem, as highlighted by Joe's trouble in the hypothetical, is that
a buyer's options may be very restricted due to the shrinkwrap terms he is now
bound by pursuant to ProCD. The following are but a few terms a shrinkwrap
agreement may impose on the consumer: limitations on warranty protection to
only specific parts of the product and for varying periods of coverage, costs for
shipping or otherwise transporting the good to the manufacture or authorized
dealer, authorization for several weeks without use and enjoyment of the goods
while the product is undergoing repair, and numerous circumstances may be
129 U.C.C. § 2-607(4) provides "The burden is on the buyer to establish any breach
with respect to the goods accepted." U.C.C. § 2-608(2) precludes revocation after
acceptance if there is "any substantial change in condition of the goods which is not
caused by their own defects." U.C.C. § 2-607(4) (1999).
130 U.C.C. § 2-513 provides buyers right to inspect the goods before acceptance.
U.C.C. § 2-512(2) makes clear that this right to inspect prior to acceptance is not waived
merely by making payment. U.C.C. §§ 2-512(2), 513 (1999).
131 U.C.C. § 2-601 (1999).
132 U.C.C. § 2-602(2)(b) (1999).
133 U.C.C. § 2-602(2)(a) (1999).
134 U.C.C. § 2-602(2)(c) (1999).
135 U.C.C. § 2-606 (1999).
136 U.C.C. § 2-602(1) states that the period in which a buyer must notify the seller of
his rejection of goods is "a reasonable time after their delivery or tender." U.C.C. § 2-
606(1)(b) adds that this period is at least as long as to allow the buyer a reasonable
opportunity to inspect the goods. U.C.C. §§ 2-602(1), 606(1)(b) (1999).
137 "Acceptance of goods by the buyer precludes rejection of the goods
accepted..." U.C.C. § 2-607(2) (1999).
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specified under which the warranty is voided. Furthermore, an unsatisfied
customer may be bound by shrinkwrap terms that restrict the fora in which he
may sue for breach and which damages may be obtainable should the suit be
successful. These potential restrictions on the buyer's ability to seek remedy,
together with the hassle and expense either dealing with the warrantor or
maintaining a lawsuit, can make it difficult for a consumer to obtain justice. Even
where the consumer has a good case for demonstrating that these limitations
result in the warranty failing its essential purpose, he still faces the expense, time,
and trouble of litigating the case or participating in the dispute resolution required
in the warranty contract.
In some cases, an alternative to the breach of contract action is available to
buyers who have lost their opportunity to simply reject the goods and get a
refund. If the buyer meets the requirements specified in U.C.C. § 2-608, explored
in the section below, he may revoke his acceptance of the good and is afforded
the "same rights... as if he had rejected them."138
B. When a Buyer May Revoke Acceptance Under Currently Enacted
Article 2
As U.C.C. § 2-608 Official Comment One makes clear, the invention of the
phrase "revocation of acceptance" was meant to shed the common law baggage
associated with the term "rescission" while essentially continuing the prior
equitable policy of undoing bad bargains where the circumstances so justify. 139
Without impeding a buyer's right to seek recovery of damages for breach, 140
U.C.C. § 2-608 states the specific circumstances under which buyers may ask the
court to excuse the buyer's prior acceptance and gives qualified buyers equivalent
rights to one who had rejected the goods.14 Under U.C.C. § 2-711, a buyer who
justifiably revokes pursuant to § 2-608 may cancel the contract and is entitled to
recover the amount already paid along with the cost of cover. 142 Furthermore, the
buyer is given a security interest in the goods for any amount paid and expenses
incurred and may resell the goods to recover this amount in the same manner as
an aggrieved seller. 143
138 U.C.C. § 2-608(3) (1999).
139 See U.C.C. § 2-608 cmt.1 (1999).
140 "[T]he buyer is no longer required to elect between revocation of acceptance and
recovery of damages for breach." Id.
141 U.C.C. § 2-608(3) (1999).
142 U.C.C. § 2-71.1(1) (1999). For each of the remedies afforded to justifiably
revoking buyers, equivalent rights are afforded to rightfully rejecting buyers. See U.C.C.
§ 2-711 (1999).
143 U.C.C. § 2-711(3) (1999). Hence, the buyer is given leverage against the party
whom he justifiably revokes. If the revoking party refuses to provide the full refund and
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1. Requirements for Revocation ofAcceptance
Taking U.C.C. § 2-608 element by element, 144 several prerequisites to
revocation become apparent. First, revocation is only proper where some non-
conformity exists.145 While the meaning of the term "non-conformity" implies
the breach of a contract or warranty, 146 a few idiosyncratic jurisdictions continue
to allow revocation against a party who has not breached. 147 However, holding
non-breaching and/or disclaiming parties harmless in revocation actions is the
better reasoned approach and one with substantial case authority. 148 Logically, a
party that has neither breached a sales contract nor breached a warranty
agreement should not be liable in a revocation action.
149
cover that § 2-711(1) says the buyer is entitled to, then the buyer may take matters into
his own hands and recover this amount through re-sale under § 2-711(3).
144 U.C.C. § 2-608 (1999) "Revocation of Acceptance in Whole or in Part").
145 U.C.C. § 2-608(1) (1999).
146 "Non-conformity," an undefined term in the U.C.C., is defined by implication by
U.C.C. § 2-106(2), which defines "conforming" goods as those "in accordance with the
obligations under the contract." Gary L. Monserud, Judgment Against a Non-Breaching
Seller: The Cost of Outrunning the Law to Do Justice Under Section 2-608 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 70 N.D. L. REV. 809, 832-33 (1994).
147 See, e.g., Troutman v. Pierce, Inc. 402 N.W.2d 920, 922-23 (N.D. 1987)
(allowing revocation against a direct seller for the manufacturer's breach stating that the
right to revoke "is not conditioned upon whether it is the seller or the manufacturer that is
responsible for the nonconformity."); Fode v. Capital RV Ctr., Inc., 575 N.W.2d 682, 688
(N.D. 1998) ("A buyer is not barred from revoking acceptance despite a seller's
disclaimer of warranties."); Griffith v. Latham Motors, Inc., 913 P.2d 572, 577 (Idaho
1996) ("It is not inconsistent.. .for the jury to have found that the [buyer] had a right to
revoke acceptance against [seller] but that [seller] had not breached either an express or
an implied warranty.").
For a comprehensive survey and strong criticism of cases allowing revocation
against a disclaiming direct seller see Flechtner, supra note 3, at 414-35 (1998) and
Monserud, supra note 146, at 814-37 (providing an in-depth analysis and critic of
Troutman).
148 See, e.g., Cissell Mfg. Co. v. Park, 36 P.3d 85, 89 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001)
("Whether goods are nonconforming requires reference to the terms of the contract and to
the law of warranty."); Gulfwind S., Inc. v. Jones, 775 So. 2d 311, 313 (Fla. Ct. App.
2000) ("[B]efore a buyer can elect to revoke acceptance, he or she must demonstrate a
nonconformity to some provision in the contract."); Flechtner, supra note 3, at 403 n.9
(listing seven cases and one concurring opinion refusing to accept revocation against
sellers not in breach); White, supra note 18, at 1075-79 ("There is considerable
precedent for the proposition that sellers are not liable for breach of a manufacturer
warranty ... ").
149 Considering the effect of holding non-breaching and/or disclaiming sellers liable
in a revocation action is commensurate to saying that sellers must always warrant their
goods. Such a holding is clearly at odds with the express provisions of § 2-316(2) and (3)
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The second prerequisite is that the non-conformity must in fact substantially
impair its value to the buyer, regardless of the seller's knowledge of the buyer's
particular circumstances.' 50 As the Virginia Supreme Court explained this
requirement:
A buyer's right to revoke acceptance does not arise from every breach of
warranty[,] it arises only where the value of the goods to the buyer is
substantially impaired.. .The test of such impairment is not, however, a
diminution in value of the goods on the open market, or to the average buyer, but
rather a substantial impairment of value to the particular buyer involved ....
[T]he buyer must offer objective evidence showing: (1) that the goods fail to
conform to the terms of the contract of sale, and (2) that the nonconformity
substantially impairs the value of the goods to the buyer. 151
Other courts have required a more subjective test for whether the goods
substantially impair their value to a particular buyer. 152 These courts follow the
"shaken faith doctrine,"'153 where, especially in extreme cases, the nonconformity
is found based on the negative feelings the consumer understandably engenders
towards a good that, for instance, puts the buyer's personal health at risk154 or has
which provide numerous examples on how sellers may disclaim the implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. See supra note 21 and accompanying
text. See also Monserud, supra note 146, at 835 (1994) (pointing out that "nothing in
Article 2 establishes vicarious liability [for non-breaching parties]" and that the language
of the remedial section of Article 2 (Part 7) "strongly implies that any defendant against
whom remedies can be employed must be a party in breach."); Flechtner, supra note 3, at
434-35; compare White, supra note 18, at 1055-59, 1061, 1069. White argues that
manufacturers are the most efficient product insurers in most market situations. He
nevertheless concludes that since revocation is not allowed against remote manufacturers
in most jurisdictions sellers should bear the liability where they agree to take
responsibility for warranty service. See id.
150 See U.C.C. § 2-608(1)(a) & cmt.2 (1999).
151 Gasque v. Mooers Motor Car Co., Inc., 313 S.E.2d 384, 388-89 (Va. 1984).
112 Id. at 386-87.
153 Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 240 A.2d 195, 205 (N.J. Super. 1968)
(allowing revocation and stating famously, "[o]nce their faith is shaken, the [good] loses
not only its real value in their eyes, but becomes an instrument whose integrity is
substantially impaired and whose operation is fraught with apprehension. The attempted
cure [replacement] in the present case was ineffective.").
154 See Overland Bond & Inv. Corp. v. Howard, 292 N.E.2d 168, 177 (Ill. App. Ct.
1972) ("[T]here can be little doubt that defendants' car, after having had the transmission
fall out, and then experiencing a complete failure of the brakes (both dangerous
occurrences while defendant was traveling on an expressway), was so hazardous to drive
that the value of defendants' contract for the car was substantially impaired.").
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been a terrible inconvenience. 155 The common refrain in such cases is that the
warranty "fails of its essential purpose" where, for instance, the non-conformity
persists despite numerous attempts by the authorized warranty service repair shop
to cure the non-conformity. 156
The third requirement is that the buyer's acceptance of the good must be
excusable despite the presence of the non-conformity. This condition is met if
either the buyer accepted the good "on the reasonable assumption that its non-
conformity would be cured" or if the buyer did not discover the non-conformity at
the time of acceptance. 157 Where the buyer claims the latter, he must further
prove that he was "reasonably induced" to believe the goods were conforming
either because of "the difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the seller's
assurances."158.
Next, the buyer must supply a sufficient 159 notice to the seller within a
reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered the grounds for
revocation. 160 This condition is of vital concern in light of U.C.C. § 2-607's
ultimatum: "the buyer must within a reasonable time.. .notify the seller of breach
or be barred from any remedy."' 161 Also, in order to protect his right to revoke
acceptance of goods, the buyer must ensure that the goods do not undergo "any
substantial change in condition.., not caused by their own defects."'162
In a tripartite rolling contract context, assuming the above requirements have
been met, the final hurdle facing a revoking buyer is the following: against whom
may the buyer exercise her power of revocation? Where the buyer has purchased
the goods from a solvent retailer who warrants the goods, the issue is
155 Tiger Motor Co., Inc. v. McMurtry, 224 So. 2d 638, 646 & n.5, (Ala. 1969)
(finding substantial impairment of value where a new car was returned to dealer more
than 30 times for repair).
156 Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imps., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349, 357 (Minn. 1977) (en banc)
(finding that a succession of minor repairs demonstrated that the warranty for repair
failed of its essential purpose).
157 U.C.C. § 2-608(1)(a), (b) (1999).
158 U.C.C. § 2-608(1)(b).
159 "Sufficient" content of the notice required under U.C.C. § 2-608 is generally
more than mere notification of breach as is required for rejection under U.C.C. § 2-607.
See U.C.C. § 2-608 cmt.5 (amended 2003).
160 See U.C.C. § 2-608(2) (amended 2003). Official Comment 4 to § 2-608 provides
some guidance on what is a reasonable amount of time. "[T]he reasonable time period
should extend in most cases beyond the time in which notification of breach must be
given, beyond the time for discovery of non-conformity after acceptance and beyond the
time for rejection after tender." U.C.C. § 2-608 cmt.4 (amended 2003).
161 See U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) (1999). The Official Comment 4 to § 2-607, explains
that "a reasonable time" for notification from a retail consumer is longer than that of a
merchant because the rule "is designed to prevent commercial bad faith, not deprive a
good faith consumer of his remedy."
162 See U.C.C. § 2-608(2) (amended 2003).
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uncontroversial. In a typical case the buyer will simply bring back the goods and
get her refund from the breaching seller. Where such convenience is not feasible,
however-for example, if the retailer has gone out of business or the seller
disclaimed all warranties-the buyer must look for other ways to be satisfied. Can
the manufacturer who included shrinkwrapped terms inside the product
packaging be a source of relief for purposes of the revocation action? The next
two sections address the split of authority on this issue.
2. The Majority View: Revocation Proper Against Direct Sellers Only
Most courts that have faced the issue have found that a buyer may not revoke
acceptance under § 2-608 against a remote manufacturer with whom the buyer is
not in privity of sales contract. Professor Gary L. Monserud cataloged twelve
relevant cases in a pair of articles published in 1994.163 Supplementing and
updating Professor Monserud's work, I have identified at least ten additional
cases following the majority view.164
163 As reported by Professor Monserud, these cases are the following:
Voytovich v. Bangor Punta Operations, Inc., 494 F.2d 1208, 1211 (6th Cir. 1974)
(applying Ohio law); Seekings v. Jimmy GMC of Tucson, Inc., 638 P.2d 210, 214
(Ariz. 1981); Conte v. Dwan Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 374 A.2d 144, 149-50 (Conn.
1976); Volvo of Am. Corp. v. Wells, 551 S.W.2d 826, 829 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977);
Henderson v. Chrysler Corp., 477 N.W.2d 505, 507 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); Alberti
v. Manufactured Homes, Inc., 381 S.E.2d 478, 480 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989), affd in
part, rev'd in part, vacated in part, 407 S.E.2d 819 (N.C. 1991); Wright v. O'Neal
Motors, Inc., 291 S.E.2d 165, 169 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982); Cooper v. Mason, 188
S.E.2d 653, 655 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972); Edelstein v. Toyota Motor Distrib., 422 A.2d
101, 104 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980); Noice v. Paul's Marine & Camping Ctr.,
Inc., 451 N.E.2d 528, 532 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982); Fun[k] v. Montgomery
AMC/Jeep/Renault, 586 N.E.2d 1113, 1116-17 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990); Gasque v.
Mooers Motor Car Co., Inc., 313 S.E.2d 384, 390 (Va. 1984); Reece v. Yeager Ford
Sales, Inc., 184 S.E.2d 727, 731 (W. Va. 1971); Crume v. Ford Motor Co., 653 P.2d
564, 566 (Or. Ct. App. 1982). See also Andover Air Ltd. P'ship v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1494, 1500 (D. Mass. 1989) (assuming
that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court would follow the majority); Ayanru
v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 495 N.Y.S.2d 1018, 1023 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1985)
(finding revocation effective only between buyer and person who sells or contracts
to sell goods); Hart Honey Co. v. Cudworth, 446 N.W.2d 742, 744 (N.D. 1989)
(defining the term "seller" with reference to WHITE & SUMMERS § 8-4 (3d ed. 1988),
thus aligning itself with the majority).
Monserud, supra note 146, at 812 n.20 (1994); see also Gary L. Monserud, Rounding Out
the Remedial Structure of Article 2: The Case for a Forced Exchange Between a Buyer
and a Remote Seller, 19 U. DAYTON L. REv. 353, 359-366 (1994) (discussing several of
the majority view cases).
164 The additional majority-view cases, barring revocation of acceptance by a buyer
against a remote manufacturer, are the following: Kutzler v. Thor Indus., Inc., No. 03-
C2389, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11886, at *23 (N.D. Ill. July 11, 2003) (noting a conflict
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Textually, the majority view takes its root in the undisputed fact that the
currently enacted version of U.C.C. § 2-608 refers in several places to "the seller."
165 The term "seller" is defined in U.C.C. § 2-103(d) as "a person who sells or
contracts to sell goods."'1 66 Furthermore, a "sale" is defined by U.C.C. § 2-106(1)
as "the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price."'167 Thus, the
argument goes, since title does not pass from the manufacturer directly to the
consumer, but instead passes via an intermediary retailer, the manufacturer cannot
be considered a seller as required by § 2-608. The lack'of privity in the sales
contract would therefore allow a manufacturer who may actually be in breach of
warranty to escape liability under the revocation theory, forcing the consumer to
seek remedy on the manufacturer's terms pursuant to the shrinkwrapped
agreement. Stated another way, the majority view is that revocation against a
of authority among Illinois courts and electing to follow the Virginia Supreme Court's
decision in Gasque, 313 S.E.2d at 390, which barred revocation as "conceptually
inapplicable" to manufacturers not in privity.); Neal v. SMC Corp., 99 S.W.3d 813, 817-
18 (Tex. App. 2003) ("[T]he remedy of revocation is available to the buyer only against
the immediate seller and ... the manufacturer, in the absence of a contractual relationship
with the consumer, is not a seller. A manufacturer's express warranty does not provide a
contractual relationship to the sale under section 2.608."); Miller v. Pettibone Corp., 693
So. 2d 1372, 1375 (Ala. 1997); Griffith v. Latham Motors, Inc., 913 P.2d 572, 577 (Idaho
1996) (restricting revocation to a direct seller, thus following the majority view, but
allowing revocation against such a seller even where there is no breach); Hardy v.
Winnebago Indus., Inc., 706 A.2d 1086, 1091 (Md. App. 1998); Duall Bldg. Restoration,
Inc. v. 1143 E. Jersey Ave. Assocs., Inc., 652 A.2d 1225, 1229 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1995) (stating in dicta that if plaintiff's cause of action for breach of warranty was not
upheld then the buyer "would be substantially without a remedy against the manufacturer
for economic injury resulting from its producing and selling a defective product.");
Aluminum Line Prods. Co. v. Rolls-Royce Motors, Inc., 649 N.E.2d 887, 893 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1994); Copiers Typewriters Calculators, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 576 F. Supp. 312,
323 (D.C. Md. 1983) (holding that a buyer "is required to establish privity of contract
between itself and [the remote manufacturer] in order to maintain [all] the claims it
asserts," which included a claim for revocation of acceptance); Royal Lincoln-Mercury
Sales, Inc. v. Wallace, 415 So. 2d 1024, 1028 (Miss. 1982) (no revocation of acceptance
allowed against remote manufacturer for breach of implied warranty of merchantability);
Clark v. Ford Motor Co., 612 P.2d 316, 319 (Or. Ct. App 1980) (establishing as a matter
of law that a buyer may not revoke acceptance against a manufacturer whom he did not
buy from directly); Gaha v. Taylor-Johnson Dodge, Inc., 632 P.2d 483, 486 (Or. Ct. App
1981) (re-affirmed Clark but holding that if an agency relationship between retailer and
manufacturer can be established for the purposes of the sale then revocation by the buyer
as against the remote manufacturer will lie).
165 U.C.C. § 2-608(2) states that revocation is "not effective until the buyer notifies
the seller of it." (emphasis added). Additionally, U.C.C. § 2-608(1)(b) refers specifically
to "the seller." U.C.C. § 2-608 (1999).
166 U.C.C. § 2-103(d) (1999).
167 U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (1999).
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breaching remote manufacturer does not "fit" the scenario envisioned by U.C.C.
§ 2-608.168
A very recent case decided by in the District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois, Kutzler v. Thor Indus.,169 serves as a good representation of the
majority view cases. United States Magistrate Judge Schenkier articulates each of
the three primary arguments for the majority construction of U.C.C. § 2-608,
finding revocation barred due to: (1) the plain language of § 2-608,170 (2) lack of
privity,171 and (3) a belief that revocation does not "fit" as a remedy in a tripartite
rolling contract. 172
In this case a tripartite rolling contract was formed among the following
parties: Mr. Kutzler, was the buyer of a $400,000 motor home; Bernard Chevrolet
was the direct seller (dealer); and Thor was the manufacturer and third-party
warrantor. 173 When a number of defects became apparent soon after purchase, 174
Mr. Kutzler took the motor home to the authorized dealer for repair pursuant to
his warranty agreement with the manufacturer.175 After numerous attempts at
repair, Mr. Kutzler notified Thor that he was revoking acceptance because the
repeated failures by the dealer to cure the vehicle's many defects. 176 When Thor
168 See Flechtner, supra note 3, at 435.
[T]he remedies triggered by revocation do not, as a substantive and functional
matter, "fit" the arrangement between a buyer and a third party warrantor because
these remedies would require the warrantor to refund a purchase price it had not
received in exchange for a product it did not sell to the revoking party.
Id. See also Monserud, supra note 5, 208 ("The critics have laid claim to a simple truth:
That revocation of acceptance and rejection and refund were truly designed as remedies
for immediate parties to a contract for sale and consequently do not fit easily when
applied between remote parties.").
169 No. 03-C2389, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11886, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 11, 2003).
170 See id. at *24
171 See id at *17-*19, *25
172 See id. at *23-*24.
173 See id at *3-*4.
174 Twenty-seven defects were listed in Mr. Kutzler's complaint, including a faulty
electrical system and wiring, problems with the plumbing, defective driving lights and
brakes, defective steps, doors, and bumpers, and a defective engine and transmission. His
complaint even throws in a defective kitchen sink. Id. at *5.
175 Thor provided 24 month/24,000 mile, limited written warranty that expressly
disclaimed coverage for certain items, such as the chassis, engine, and tires, which were
covered by other warranties. Kutzler v. Thor Indus., Inc., No. 03-C2389, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11886, *3 (N.D. Ill. July 11, 2003). Only those defects covered by the warranty
were considered as a basis for the revocation action. Id. at *20-*2 1.
176 See id at 5-6. Here Kutzler makes use of the "shaken faith doctrine." See supra
notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
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refused, Kutzler sued for revocation of acceptance and breach of express and
implied warranty.177
Statutory language and concerns with privity influenced the Judge
Schenkier's opinion to reject the revocation claim despite finding a breach of
warranty.178 He noted "[a]s a preliminary" matter that the cases allowing
revocation "do not come to grips with the plain language of Section 2-608,"
rather, they merely concede that a buyer-seller relationship seems to be
required. 179 These cases were also troubling to the judge because they disregard
the requirement of privity, which the Illinois Supreme Court had recently
reaffirmed as being relevant in implied warranty actions for economic loss.180
Finally, U.S. Magistrate Judge Schenkier was persuaded that revocation was
not the right "fit" as a remedy in this case. Judge Schenkier relied heavily on the
Virginia Supreme Court decision in Gasque v. Mooers Motor Car181 to inform
his understanding of the issues:
[W]hen applicable, the remedy of revocation "cancels a contract of sale, restores
title to and possession of the goods to the seller, restores the purchase price to the
buyer, and as fairly as possible, returns the contracting parties to the status quo
ante." The Virginia Supreme Court reasoned that because the remote
manufacturer is not involved in the sale transaction, it should have no
involvement in the unwinding of that transaction that is the purpose of the
remedy of revocation. Thus, the court held that "the remedy of revocation of
acceptance under... [Section 2-608] is conceptually inapplicable to any persons
other than the parties to the contract of sale sought to be rescinded."' 182
Thus, Judge Schenkier followed the Virginia Supreme Court in finding that
revocation under U.C.C. § 2-608 is not an available remedy for a buyer against a
breaching remote manufacturer. 183
177 See id. at *6, *20. Buyers may plead breach of warranty and revocation of
acceptance as alternative theories. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
178 See id. at *20-*21.
179 Id. at *24-*25 (citing Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imps., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349, 357
(Minn. 1978)).
180 See id. at *19-*20, *25 ("[T]he cases cited by the plaintiff all employ an
interpretation of Section 2-608 that disregards the privity requirement, which recent
Illinois Supreme Court precedent strongly indicates that Illinois is not prepared to
do .... ).
181 313 S.E.2d 384, 384 (Va. 1984).
182 Kutzler v. Thor Indus., Inc., No. 03-C2389, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11886, at
*23 (N.D. Ill. July 11, 2003) (internal citations omitted).
183 See id. at *25-*27.
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3. The Minority View: Revocation AllowedAgainst Remote Manufacturers
A significant minority of jurisdictions have followed the opposite
interpretation of U.C.C. § 2-608, allowing buyers to revoke acceptance against a
remote manufacturer. Often, courts 184 and commentators 185 following in this
construction of § 2-608 make a point of dispensing with the privity requirement
as an outdated remnant of the common law. For example, in Ventura v. Ford
Motor Corp., 186 the court stated the following:
Only the privity concept, which is frequently viewed as a relic these days, has
interfered with a rescission-type remedy against the manufacturer of goods not
purchased directly from the manufacturer. If we focus on the fact that the
warranty creates a direct contractual obligation to the buyer, the reason for
allowing the same remedy that is available against a direct seller becomes
clear.
18 7
Ventura makes the point that concerns for privity and the "fit" of the
revocation remedy are misplaced where a manufacturer engages in inducing the
184 As collected in Professor Gary L. Monserud, the following cases find revocation
despite lack of privity between the buyer and remote manufacturer:
Ford Motor Credit Co., v. Harper, 671 F.2d 1117, 1126 (8th Cir. 1982) (applying
Arkansas law); Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imps., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349, 357 (Minn.
1978); Volkswagen of Am., Inc., v. Novak, 418 So. 2d 801, 804 (Miss. 1982); Royal
Lincoln-Mercury Sales, Inc. v. Wallace, 415 So. 2d 1024, 1029 (Miss. 1982);
Ventura v. Ford Motor Corp., 433 A.2d 801, 811 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981);
Gochey v. Bombardier, Inc., 572 A.2d 921, 923 (Vt. 1990); see Smith v. Navistar
Int'l Transp. Corp., 714 F. Supp. 303, 309 (N.D. Ill. 1989); (applying the "close
connection" doctrine of Christianson v. Venturi Const. Co., 440 N.E. 2d 226, 228
(Ill. App. Ct. 1982) to allow buyer to bring action against financing company for
seller's breach under financing instrument); Erling v. Homera, Inc., 298 N.W.2d
478, 479 (N.D. 1980) (sustaining a judgment which allowed revocation of
acceptance and held both the immediate seller and remote seller (manufacturer)
liable for return of the purchase price).
Monserud, supra note 146, at 812 n.20 (1994). For a discussion of a number of these
cases see, Monserud, supra note 163, at 365-73 (1994).
185 See Flechtner, supra note 3, at 438.
Most of the commentators who argue that revocation should be available
against third-party warrantors... adopt the position of some of the cases that
permitting revocation against a third-party warrantor is merely a continuation of the
process of removing outmoded privity barriers that interfere with the proper
enforcement of rights.
Id.
186 433 A.2d 801 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981).
187 Id. at 811-12;
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buyer's purchase by marketing and passing along a warranty to the end purchaser.
In Ventura and cases adopting its rationale, 188 the warranty creates a direct
contract, the failure of the product to perform as advertised creates a breach, and
assuming the other conditions of § 2-608 are met, revocation of acceptance is
justified against the manufacturer. 189 Whether called a "direct contract" as does
Ventura190 or simply an "obligation" as does the new 2003 Amendment to § 2-
313,191 Ventura remains a powerful argument for the principal that a sufficiently
close relationship exists between manufacturer and consumer to allow revocation.
Ventura's implication of manufacturers' culpability due to their activities in
inducing sale gathers strength from the well established principal that breaching
third-party warrantors cannot hide behind "the citadel of privity" to avoid liability
for warranty.192 The rationale for holding manufacturers' liable is eloquently
stated by the New York Court of Appeals in Randy Knitwear v. American
Cyanamid:19 3
Manufacturers make extensive use of newspapers, periodicals and other media to
call attention, in glowing terms, to the qualities and virtues of their products, and
this advertising is directed at the ultimate consumer or at some manufacturer or
supplier who is not in privity with them. Equally sanguine representations on
packages and labels frequently accompany the article throughout its journey to
the ultimate consumer and, as intended, are relied upon by remote purchasers.
Under these circumstances, it is highly unrealistic to limit a purchaser's
protection to warranties made directly to him by his immediate seller. The
188 See, e.g., Gochey v. Bombardier, 572 A.2d 921, 924 (Vt. 1990).
We agree with the rationale expressed in Ventura that when a manufacturer
expressly warrants its goods, it, in effect, creates a direct contract with the ultimate
buyer.. .When the manufacture's defect results in revocation by the consumer, the
manufacturer must assume the liability it incurred when it warranted the product to
the ultimate user.
Id. (citations omitted).
189 Ventura, 433 A.2d at 812.
190 See id.
191 The 2003 Amendments to Article 2 indicate that the jurisprudential landscape is
moving away from Ventura's label of the parties relationship, direct warranty contract, in
favor of the new label, "obligation." See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
192 Nearly all jurisdictions now adopt the position that buyers may bring breach of
warranty claims against a manufacturer not in privity of sales contract. See Monserud,
supra note 184, at 393 (1994); Flechtner, supra note 3, at 439; but see supra note 152 and
accompanying text.
193 181 N.E.2d 399, 399 (N.Y. 1962).
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protection he really needs is against the manufacturer whose published
representations caused him to make the purchase. 194
The comparison of manufacturer liability on the contract for breach of
warranty in Randy Knitwear, with their liability off the contract under the
revocation theory of Ventura is also useful in another line of attack on the
majority construction of § 2-608.195 Courts allowing revocation against a remote
manufacturer have mitigated § 2-608's apparent textual limitations by pointing
out that the warranty provisions of the code refer repeatedly to "the seller."'196
Therefore, since currently enacted sections 2-313197 and 2-314,198 dealing with
express and implied warranties respectively, each use the term "seller," section 2-
608's reference to "the seller" should benefit from the same liberal
construction.' 99 "In states where revocation of acceptance and refund are denied
for lack of privity, and where damages for breach of warranty are allowed without
privity, 'seller' has a double meaning." 200
194 Id., at 402. The 2003 Amendments to Article 2 specifically adopt the principal of
Randy Knitwear in the codification of new U.C.C. § 2-313B. See supra notes 186-87 and
accompanying text.
195 See Monserud, supra, note 163, at 391-98.
196 See, e.g., Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imps., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349, 357 (Minn. 1977)
(en banc) (dismissing problems with § 2-608's reference to "the seller" by observing that
absence of privity would not have barred plaintiff's suite on the warranty despite
reference to the term "seller" in the warranty sections of Article 2).
197 U.C.C. § 2-313. Express Warranties by Affirmation, Promise, Description,
Sample.
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer...
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use
formal words ... but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement
purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods does not
create a warranty.
U.C.C. § 2-313 (1999) (emphasis added).
198 U.C.C. § 2-314. Implied Warranty: Merchantability; Usage of Trade.
(1).. [A] warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for
their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. ...
U.C.C. § 2-314 (1999) (emphasis added).
199 See, e.g., Gochey v. Bombardier, 572 A.2d 921, 923 (Vt. 1990) (citing Durfee v.
Rod Baxter Imps., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349, 357 (Minn. 1977) (en banc)).
200 Monserud, supra note 163, at 393.
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C. Future Trends indicating Tripartite Revocation
1. 2003 Amendments to Article 2 Alleviate Textual, Privity Issues with
Revocation
While the 2003 amendments do not explicitly adopt the minority
interpretation of § 2-608, they arguably do more to support revocation against
remote manufacturers than current Article 2. They do this in two ways. First, the
amendments help to alleviate the textual problem created by § 2-608's repeated
use of the term "seller." Second, the amendments explicitly reject lack of privity
as a means of escape for manufacturers who induce consumer sales by engaging
in advertising of the warranties they include in goods.
The 2003 Amendments to Article 2 contemplate that a manufacturer be
labeled a "seller" for the purposes of enforcing a warranty obligation.20 1 Section
2-608 is left substantively unchanged by the 2003 amendments, continuing to
specify the conditions under which a buyer may revoke acceptance against a
seller.20 2 Therefore, reading the revised statute as a whole, § 2-608's use of the
term "seller" need not present a bar to revocation against a manufacturer. 
203
Secondly, the drafters arguably helped the minority construction of § 2-608
by putting another nail in the coffin already inhabited by the doctrine of privity.
By adopting the rule of Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., the
2003 amendments make clear that breach of a promise or affirmation of fact
related to the goods that are marketed and passed along to consumers by a
manufacturer cannot be defended by lack of privity.204 Thus, recognition of the
closeness of the manufacturer/consumer relationship, due to the manufacturer's
inducement of sale, strengthens the minority contention that revocation of
acceptance by a buyer against a manufacturer is a remedy that "fits."
201 See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
202 See U.C.C. § 2-608 (amended 2003).
203 Had the drafters (or state legislatures following adoption) meant to limit
revocation under U.C.C. § 2-608 to direct sellers they could have used the term
"immediate buyer" in place of seller and "remote purchaser" in place of buyer as they did
in § 2-313A and B. The 2003 Amendments demonstrate that the drafters know how to
restrict a remedy to the direct seller only when they wish. Therefore, a reading of the
statute as a whole gives some support to the idea that U.C.C. § 2-608 may be construed as
allowing revocation actions against remote manufacturers, which the warranty sections
define by implication as being a "seller."
204 See U.C.C. § 2-313B (amended 2003) and Proposed Comment 1; see supra notes
180-86 and accompanying text.
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2. UCITA Allows Revocation of Acceptance for Computer Information
Copies
As the prefatory comment to the UCITA explains, the code is meant to
recognize the particularities of transactions involving computer information
where the thing that is sold or licensed is often just a copy and not a tangible item
in and of itself.20 5 In the case where a software copy has "material defects"
UC1TA § 707 provides for a form of revocation of acceptance based on U.C.C.
§ 2-608.206 Like revocation of acceptance for goods under U.C.C. § 2-608, under
UCITA § 707 "[t]he revoking party is no longer liable for the price of the copy
and, in appropriate circumstances, can obtain a refund. '207 However, unlike
U.C.C. § 2-608, the concept of return is not relevant in UCITA § 707 "because it
refers to rights on rejecting a contract, not refusing a copy tendered pursuant to a
contract. '20 8 Nowhere in this section is a limitation on revocation created for
direct buyer-seller transactions despite the fact that other sections specifically
adopt rolling contracts for the sale of computer information. 209 Thus, UC1TA
allows revocation of defective computer software copies against a remote
manufacturer in a tripartite rolling contract.
V. TRIPARTITE ROLLING CONTRACTS SHOULD BE REVOCABLE AGAINST
THEIR OFFEROR
As discussed in the preceding sections, tripartite rolling contracts are formed
in the manner prescribed by ProCD. Whether or not they may be revoked after
formation is the subject of debate in the split of authority construing U.C.C. § 2-
608. I suggest in this section simply that what is good for the goose is good for the
gander. That is, the principles that underlie formation of a tripartite rolling
contract should be equally applicable to their revocation.
A. Close Enough To Form Means Close Enough To Revoke
Randy Knitwear v. American Cyanamid,210 signaled long ago that the
"citadel of privity" has fallen for the purpose of enforcing warranties. Building on
this premise, the Ventura case makes the point that manufacturers and end
purchasers are not such distant parties that revocation would be an inappropriate
205 See UCITA prefatory note (2001).
206 See UCITA § 707 cmts.1, 2 (amended 2002).
207 UCITA § 707 cmt. 1 (amended 2002).
208 Id.
209 See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
210 See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
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remedy.211 The 2003 Amendments to Article 2 adopt the general principal of
manufacturer obligation in a tripartite rolling contract while also alleviating the
textual limitation some majority-view courts have fixated on in denying
revocation.212
ProCD further illustrates the closeness of the buyer/remote manufacturer
relationship through its defense of the rights of manufacturers to enforce the terms
of shrinkwrap agreements in tripartite rolling contracts. Central to Judge
Easterbrook's reasoning in ProCD is his contention that the buyer and remote
manufacturer are intimately connected through an offer and acceptance
process.213 Easterbrook points to U.C.C. §§ 2-602 and 2-606, defining acceptance
and rejection of goods, to reinforce his argument:
A buyer accepts goods under § 2-606(l)(b) when, after an opportunity to
inspect, he fails to make an effective rejection under § 2-602(1). ProCD extended
an opportunity to reject if a buyer should find the license terms unsatisfactory;
Zeidenberg inspected the package, tried out the software, learned of the license,
and did not reject the goods. We refer to § 2-606 only to show that the
opportunity to return goods can be important... the UCC consistently permits
the parties to structure their relations so that the buyer has a chance to make a
final decision after a detailed review.214
Ironically, both of the U.C.C. sections cited by Judge Easterbrook to support
his point are victims of the same outmoded phraseology that creates the split of
authority in construing U.C.C. § 2-608. Both §§ 2-602 and 2-606 repeatedly refer
to "the seller."215 Therefore, if these sections are to be interpreted consistently,
whatever meaning is imputed to the term "seller" for purposes of formation of the
211 See supra notes 187-93 and accompanying text.
212 See supra Part IV.C.1.
213 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1447, 1452.
214 d. at 1452-53.
215 U.C.C. § 2-602 states:
(1) Rejection of goods ... is ineffective unless the buyer seasonably notifies
the seller. (2)... (a) after rejection any exercise of ownership by the buyer ... is
wrongful as against the seller; and (b) if the buyer has before rejection taken
physical possession of goods.., he is under a duty after rejection to hold them with
reasonable care at the seller's disposition for a time sufficient to permit the seller to
remove them... (3) The seller's rights with respect to goods wrongfully rejected are
governed by the provisions of this Article on Seller's remedies in general (Section 2-
703).
U.C.C. § 2-602 (1999) (emphasis added). Similarly, U.C.C. § 2-606 states, "(1)
Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer (a).. signifies to the seller that the goods
are conforming or. .. (c) does any act inconsistent with the seller's ownership . .
U.C.C. § 2-606 (1999) (emphasis added).
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tripartite rolling contract under ProCD should be employed for defining the scope
of the same term "seller" in U.C.C. § 2-608.
On the facts of ProCD, this modem form of contracting, via shrinkwrap
agreement, took place not between a direct seller and buyer but via the
manufacturer and the buyer. Thus, Easterbrook's examples of the modem usage
of trade apply directly to tripartite rolling contracts. Just because the direct
connection between manufacturer and end purchaser does not fit the classic direct
seller/buyer model does not somehow mean that buyers should lose their rights to
a refund on breach. Stated simply, revocation "fits" as a remedy between
manufacturer and end purchaser at least as well as shrink wrap agreements "fit"
as a mode of forming the tripartite rolling contract to begin with.
Professor Harry M. Flechtner points out the buyer's payment to the retailer
did not directly benefit the manufacturer and that requiring a full refund be paid
by the manufacturer would unjustly enrich the retailer. 216 What this argument
boils to down as a practical matter is the difference between the wholesale cost
and the retail cost of the consumer good.217
A buyer should not be prevented from being made whole for the sole
practical reason of keeping a breaching manufacturer from eating the retailers'
marginal profit when goods are defective and cannot be fixed. First, the
manufacturer engages in the practice of issuing the warranty because of the very
real benefit it receives in increased sales to retailers. Whether direct or indirect,
the money is just as green. Secondly, manufacturers need only worry about
revocation where its goods are defective and where the warranty service fails to
correct the defect--otherwise the warranty itself would resolve the issue.
Arguably, a scrupulous company would want to offer a customer a refund
anyway in such situations if only to protect its good name. Thirdly, should
manufacturers decide that it is disadvantageous to stand behind their products
they can always avoid making warranties to begin with. Such an approach would
more honestly communicate to consumers the true value of the goods they
purchase.
B. Revocation of Tripartite Rolling Contracts Is Sound Policy
It makes good economic sense for manufacturers to bear the extra cost of the
marginal price when their goods are nonconforming and their warranties fail of
their essential purpose. First, the manufacturer is the party responsible for the
breach and should be encouraged to reduce defects. Being forced to refund the
retail price for goods that are defective and cannot be remedied under the terms of
the warranty creates an incentive to reduce such defects in future goods.
Furthermore, manufacturers are encouraged to draft their warranty agreements
216 See Flechtner, supra note 3, at 445-47.
217 See Monserud, supra note 5, at 208.
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and structure their means of servicing defective products in a manner that actually
solves the consumer's problem rather than imposing the hardship that would lead
a consumer to seek a revocation. Also, where manufacturers are very large, and
many are, they will likely be the most efficient cost avoider not only because they
have control over the quality of the goods but also because they benefit from
economies of scale. For example, Tyco can negotiate more favorable rates for
insurance and for borrowing money than can the mom-and-pop toy store where
some of their goods are sold to the consumer. Finally, if manufacturers are
concerned that some sellers will greatly inflate the retail price above the
wholesale price, thereby increasing the manufacturer's exposure in case of
revocation, the manufacturer is given an incentive to negotiate with retailers for
lower retail sales prices.
VI. CONCLUSION
Like it or not, it appears that rolling contracts have become an integral part of
the modem day usage of trade in consumer goods. U.C.C. § 2-608, an important
remedy to consumers, given the ease by which acceptance can occur in a rolling
contract transaction, can and should be allowed in the tripartite scenario. First, the
doctrinal underpinnings of tripartite transactions should be applied as equally in
contract formation as they are in fashioning remedies for breach. Therefore, if
tripartite rolling contracts create a sufficiently close relationship for manufacturers
to bind consumers with warranty disclaimers, terms of use, and restrictions on
remedies, then it follows that this relationship is sufficiently close for consumers
to use U.C.C. § 2-608 to roll-back the rolling agreement, where justified, as they
could against a direct seller in a bipartite rolling contract. This is especially true
where the manufacturer is heavily involved in inducing the sale through
advertisement of the product itself and of the enclosed manufacturer's warranty.
By voluntarily engaging in a practice that binds an end-consumer to contract
terms, often without the consumer's full knowledge or appreciation, remote
manufacturers are not well positioned to complain when such agreements are
revoked due to manufacturer's breach and subsequent failure to cure.
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